There's a term that's making the rounds these days. 'De-militarization'. It is talked of as a non-negotiable in 'moving forward'. Politically. Of course direction of movement is very subjective and ideology-loaded. But there's this view that just as the judiciary, executive and legislative arms need to function independent of each other, so too the 'political' and 'military'. This was written five years ago. Things have changed since then. Some names are less relevant now. The issue, however, has not lost currency. Therefore, this re-post.
There was a time when the Federalist/Eelamist lobby
masquerading as neutral do-gooders who were disinterested in conflict outcome
in terms of who wins and who loses out, spent a lot of time, energy and (other
people’s) money to promote a ‘political solution’ over a ‘military
option’. They ignored the fact that
there is nothing apolitical about things military and that all choices are
‘political’; whether one uses bullet or ballot, word or silence, frown or
smile, being merely devises drawn from a shelf called ‘strategy’.
Whether or not a particular course of action was a good or
bad strategy can be assessed in terms of time frame. Maybe 100 years from now, some analyst might
prove conclusively that it was an erroneous path. Politicians and countries
seldom have the privilege of a gaze informed by extrapolating capacities of any
reasonable degree of accuracy and even if endowed thus few would have the
ability to convince in a manner that is politically significant.
We didn’t have terrorists at our gates; we had them inside
our houses. Some tried to pacify them
and got burnt. Some realized that talking was useless with someone who spoke a
different language. They realized that
the terrorist was not interested in learning the language of negotiation and
that even a bullet in his behind would not persuade Prabhakaran to change his
ways. The bullet had to be directed elsewhere and so it was.
Today, March 14, 2010, we are a land free of terrorist
threat. And we have to acknowledge as we
ought to have understood a long time ago that there are few cuts that do not
leave scars and when tumours have to be removed it is silly to expect
unblemished skin after surgery.
Here’s the rub, then.
The decision to take the LTTE out militarily was a political one. Whether or
not a militarization of the political was inevitable is only a matter of
academic interest. What is true is that it is a phenomenon that has occurred,
is occurring and is of a kind that is too significant to ignore as ‘marginal’
or ‘anomaly’. Some of it could have been
avoided of course but some of it was bound to happen.
There’s been talk of the politicization of the military for
decades. Indeed the notion that the war
would have been done with and over decades ago if the military was given its
head was quite popular. A war is not
fought only on the battlefield of course and therefore other elements do have
roles to play. Mahinda Rajapaksa played
his role and got the right people to play those other non-military roles that
complement ground, sea and air operations. Helped. Other leader, on the contrary, let political
agenda have absolute sway over military/security prerogatives. We know the
tragedies unleashed by that kind of politicization.
Yes, there was, is and always will be political direction
influencing military action. Politicization of the military is
something else and implies a crass deference to ‘prerogatives’ of party affiliation. It is impossible to stop, but it can and must
be contained in situation so war. We
should consider ourselves lucky that the military establishment had been spared
such ills for the most part. Until the
end of the war, that is. Since then, especially
with the (legitimate) decision of Rtd General Sarath Fonseka to enter politics,
there’s been a perceptible and disturbing shift, with senior officers (at the
behest of VVIPs in the Government) to go public with certain disclosures
motivated by explicit political intention.
It is too early to comment on overall impact and indeed at
this point it has taken the form of ‘phase’ rather than definite and
irreversible ‘tendency’ where the distinction between the overtly political and
the officially ‘military’ is getting smudged.
Right now what matters is how we deal with the remnant, especially the
militarization of the political.
It did not begin with Sarath Fonseka though. He was clearly looking to be ‘political’
during his last few months, and this is evident in the kinds of appointments he
was making which give credence to the theory that he was planning a
by-hook-or-by-crook attempt at capturing power.
The day he announced he was contesting, he openly brought the military
into the political arena, and the fact that he was officially ‘civilian’ and
dressed in civvies didn’t make a difference. It must be noted that he
deliberately used images of himself in military attire during his campaign,
feeding freely from that garden called ‘politicization of the military’ and the
general perceptions of the public regarding soldier, the heroism, sacrifice,
sense of gratitude etc. Fonseka consumed
a lot of that, happily.
But no, it did not begin with him. It began when the Defence
Secretary started talking politics in the interviews he gave. Fonseka himself,
as Army Commander, was not averse to talking politics on occasion. The fact
that the Defence Secretary happens to be the brother of the Executive President
also serves to bring the military dimension into the larger political
equation. Mahinda Rajapaksa did not help
matters when he decided to play with the general partiality that the voting
public had towards the troops, the ranaviruwo,
fielding several at the Provincial Council Elections.
Nevertheless, these are not important. An ex-soldier in Parliament does not up its
overall ‘militariness’ if you will. That
kind of militarization of the political is only of marginal interest and
impact. And there was enough
logic-weight in the Defence Secretary blurring distinctions by accident or
design at a time of war. He’s since
taken a back seat as it were and indicated that he will retire shortly. The worrisome articulations of militarization
lie elsewhere, therefore.
We have the matter of Sarath Fonseka’s arrest and detention
and legal action that is to follow. Ex
Chief Justice Sarath N Silva has expressed opinion on this. Silva’s opinions can easily be dismissed on
several counts. First of all he tied his
cart to Fonseka’s star (just like the JVP). The JVP knew how far Fonseka would
fly and how far therefore they could go with Fonseka. Silva may have thought
‘higher’ and therefore would have got a bruised bum. His ire is understandable.
Silva can be summarily dismissed on grounds of morality. He
is a man who more than anyone else tarnished the independence and impartiality
of the judicial system. He dragged
‘Judicial Ethics’ into the trash can and emptied it. He was selective, vindictive and self-seeking
during his tenure and having set all kinds of dangerous precedents doesn’t have
the moral authority to file plaint on procedural wrongdoing or even
legality. That’s sad, but that’s how it
is.
Gomin Dayasri has correctly pointed out that Silva’s
contentions are out of order in that he is today pandering to the manifest
ill-will of certain despicable sections of the international community,
following the I-will-spite-my-face prerogative that Fonseka has shown
preference for. All Silva’s objections hang on the legal thread about a junior
officer not having the authority to arrest a senior officer. This is correct
and it only shows that there is a loophole (H.L.D. Mahindapala has argued the
issue comprehensively in a piece titled ‘When the law is an ass why is the
ex-CJ following it?’). It means that the highest officer is above the law since
only he could arrest himself and that will not happen, especially not in the
case of ego-maniacs like Fonseka. This
is where judicial activism can play a positive role (Silva’s activism as CJ was
patently partisan, vindictive and self-serving). Whether it can happen today is a different
issue of course. If it happens and if there is ill-intent involved,
then Silva can’t complain because Silva, more than any other judge cut the road
for judicial activism and judicial
hanky-panky.
Silva’s antics are not what this is about, however. We are
talking about the militarization of the political. Sarath N Silva’s bullishness notwithstanding,
it has to be acknowledged that if there’s anything clear about the entire
process it is the manifest absence of clarity.
Fonseka didn’t do himself any favours by his loose-cannot statements and
brigand-like ways. He employed his title of Ex-Army Commander in utterly
despicable and treacherous ways. He
embarrassed the Government and having proved he was a man of such venom and
vindictive intent that he was willing to lie, he left the Government with very
few options.
Regardless of this, he remains a citizen and if equality
before the law is a notion that is cited in disregarding the fact that he was a
presidential candidate and secured 40% of the total vote, the same principle
should drive the entire process of prosecution.
Instead we hear ‘Army Act’ now and ‘civilian law’ next. We hear of military tribunals and court marshal
procedures and we hear about him being tried outside the ambit of the Army
Act.
All of this, we have to keep in mind, happen under the
considerably heavy shadows of two things, Emergency Regulations and the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, both ‘irrelevanced’ by the comprehensive defeat of
the LTTE. That’s where the ‘military’
that invaded the ‘political’ remains an occupying force.
Today we have Sarath Fonseka under arrest. We have also seen
a series of arrests of senior military officers, on suspicion of having aided
and abetted Fonseka in one or many of the crimes he is supposed to have
committed. On the one hand, if there has
been wrong doing, then ‘equality before the law’ demands action, regardless of
the ‘medalling’ that hero-status may have warranted at one time. At the same time, it is hard to believe that
the entire process is not prompted by the prerogatives of political expediency,
of removal or neutralizing of political threat for example.
Here the ‘military’ invades and occupies the political in a
different kind of way. We can call it
‘by way of precedent’. We could also say, ‘implications for tomorrow’. Today we don’t have the LTTE threat, at least
not in the way we had it a year ago. Maybe we will not have to face any kind of
terrorist threat ever again. Then again, who can tell? Who can tell what kind of crazy individual is
among us today or will be born tomorrow and what kind of destruction he/she
would be willing to unleash on society?
There could come a time when we require security forces to play a
similarly committed and effective role in vanquishing such threats. When that requirement surfaces, if Mr
Military has taken firm hold of the Political City by dint of armoury,
strategy, thinking etc., the principle of keeping different arms of the state
at specific distances from one another would have been so compromised to render
both Mr. Politician and Mr. Solider ineffective.
In short, we are showing signs of going overboard. The threats are different today from what they
were four years ago. There is an
overwhelming logic to return things to where they were, ‘things’ meaning
institutions and personnel. Gotabhaya
Rajapaksa promised he would retire. I am
waiting for him to keep his word.
There was logic in appointing military officials to handle
the IDP facilities due to the sheer magnitude of the challenge. I can’t think
of any outfit apart from the Army being able to manage the situation. The UN agencies would have floundered as
would have the civil administration, while I/NGO boys and girls would have
cried their eyes out in despair. All of them had complementary roles to play
and this is what they did. We got a
success story (compared to a lot of other places in the world). There was ‘logic’ in appointing military
officers to handle key post-war institutions.
They still have a role. For example, Major General Daya Ratnayake is
doing an excellent job at Commissioner of Rehabilitation and I can think of no
civilian who would do better than he.
Major General Chandrasiri knows Jaffna
better than any other public servant and there is logic in appointing him as
Governor, which is a civilian post.
At the same time, there has to be thinking on phasing out
the military from spheres that should be civilian preserves. The militarization of the political, then, is
taking many forms and is a phenomenon that has to be examined with sympathy to
context but also a view to the future, the implications of things continuing
this way. In this, the needs of the day
should be strictly ignored. This is a
challenge that is before Mahinda Rajapaksa. He doesn’t require a two-thirds
majority to think about it.
Malinda Seneviratne is
the Editor-in-Chief and can be reached at msenevira@gmail.com
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