Showing posts with label Impeachment of Chief Justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Impeachment of Chief Justice. Show all posts

02 February 2015

Impeachment of the people by the people with the people

Thanks to the antics of politicians and NGOs with dubious agenda (e.g. BASL, which by the way is made of a large number of tax dodgers) the office of the Chief Justice became fair game for caricature.  
The Chief Justice of a particular country was strolling down a street in deep conversation with his friend who was the Attorney General of the same country.  They suddenly see a man stabbing to death another man.  The two friends move quickly, capture the murderer, borrow a rope from a nearby house and hang him.  All is good.  Justice is served. 

No, the above didn’t happen and will not happen, not in Sri Lanka and not anywhere else.  The dispensing of ‘justice’ and not the murder, that is.  The reason is simple.  There’s a thing called established procedure. There is a thing called ‘innocent until proven guilty’.  Then there’s a thing called ‘binding precedent’.  And then, if we are talking of wrongdoing in general and if the alleged wrongdoer happens to be the Chief Justice, there are other things that come into play, for example, ‘separation of powers’ (i.e. between the Executive, Legislative and Judicial arms of the state).  There is also the dignity of institution and office.

And so we come to the case of Mohan Pieris, his appointment, its legality, the determination of illegality and his ousting.  We submit that all things considered the judiciary, the executive and the legislature, together and separately well and truly impeached the citizens of Sri Lanka over these issues. 

Judiciary
Shirani Bandaranayake was impeached in a controversial manner. The lady’s appointment to the Supreme Court though legal was highly questionable given that she had absolutely no experience in affairs of the court.  Her appointment was protested by the premier professional body of the legal community, the Bar Association (BASL), who charged that it was a political move by the then Executive President, Chandrika Kumaratunga.  After she was made CJ, her husband was appointed as Chairman, National Savings Bank and it was said that the CJ solicited this appointment.  A determination against the Divi Neguma Bill by Bandaranayake was followed by impeachment moves and circumstances point to a politically-motivated witch-hunt.  The Government either organized or gave the nod to a widespread vilification campaign against Bandaranayake.  Her response and tacit approval of protests brought further disrepute to her office since the Supreme Court was literally turned into a thovil maduwa by key members of the BASL, not to mention the politically-motivated agitation by disreputable individuals in the NGO community.   

Mohan Pieris scarred himself by meeting Mahinda Rajapaksa in the early hours of January 9, 2015, i.e. after it was clear that Rajapaksa had lost the election.   His very presence gave credence to allegations of a plot to overturn the result through a coup.  He is said to have agreed to resign if he’s offered a diplomatic posting.  Upul Jayasuriya, President of BASL, claims that Pieris asked for a diplomatic post.  What was the CJ doing negotiating with a politician who is also the head of what is no more than a glorified NGO (funded by USAID, let us not forget)?  
If indeed that request has been made, he has disgraced his office like none of his predecessors have.  That alone makes an open and shut case for impeachment. It is claimed that he promised the new President and the new Prime Minister that he would support them should he be allowed to remain as CJ.  Another case for impeachment.  These, however, remain allegations

It is clear that both Pieris and Bandaranayake have blackened the office of the Chief Justice by numerous acts of omission and commission. 

The Executive
If, as he now claims, the appointment of Pieris was illegal and as implied in the reinstating of Bandaranayake her impeachment was flawed, then Illegality of appointment was established by interpretation by President Maithripala Sirisean who ironically supported the controversial ‘impeachment’ of Bandaranayake which had in the first instance paved the way for Pieris’ appointment.  He owes a clarification.  He offered none.  The promises of ‘good governance’ and ‘compassionate rule’ were severely compromised in the process. 

Ranil Wickremesinghe, the de-facto Chief Executive of the new ‘power-sharing arrangement’, claims that Pieris was in fact with Rajapaksa in the early hours of the morning.  However, considering that Wickremesinghe himself was present, the coup-theory gets shot to pieces unless Wickremesinghe was part of that story.  That Pieris had no business to be there is beside the point.  More serious is the allegation of negotiating the ‘diplomatic-bribe’.  Wickremesinghe himself concedes that such a negotiation had his blessings as well as that of the President.  Negotiating a bribe with the CJ cannot be right.  It is a serious blemish on the promise of good governance and paints both President and Prime Minister in poor light.

The legislative
It was silent.  The very same assembly that recommended that Bandaranayake be impeached offered its silent consent to her reinstatement.  They impeached themselves thereby.  Cabinet Spokesman Rajitha Senaratne openly stated that Pieris had to be removed ‘to get things done’.  He clearly sees nothing wrong in ‘mob justice’.  In general ‘end justifies the means’ seems to have been the operational logic of those who executed the plans to remove Pieris.   The BASL, which is nothing more than a glorified NGO (funded by USAID, let us not forget) and led by a politician with party loyalties, was part of the mob that had the full blessings of key MPs and Ministers. 

Conclusion
The executive, legislature and the judiciary, then, have essentially turned the office of CJ into something like a Chairmanship in a corporation.  If CJs can be appointed and removed in this manner then why talk of separation of powers?  Why talk of Good Governance is about mob justice and convenience, if senior politicians including the President and Prime Minister approve of bribe-offering exercises and have scant respect for due process, if convenience is the name of the game (and to hell with rules and notions such as ‘justice must not only be done but appear to be done’), then it is the people who have been impeached. 

The murderer in our ‘story’ cannot be hanged before a proper trial.  The illegality of Mohan Pieris’ appointment cannot be established without a process that draws from established rules.  As things stand the President (whose stand on the whole issue is nothing more than wishy-washy) interpreted and moved.  Parliament watched.  The judges concerned have played ‘bystander’.  Mohan Pieris was essentially lynched.  And the people cheered!  And that, ladies and gentlemen, is bad and dangerous precedence. 


13 January 2013

Towards a country called Tomorrow

‘It is better to impeach too often than too seldom; if those in positions of power cannot be virtuous, they should at least be nervous’ [after Joseph Sobran]

President Mahinda Rajapaksa promised that the ruling party will show its strength when necessary. The ruling party did so on Friday, passing the impeachment motion against Chief Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake, courtesy the massive number advantage, 155 for 49 against. It was a foregone conclusion. The argument in favor of the motion referred heavily to the notion of parliamentary supremacy and the weight of Standing Orders (in particular 78A) vis-Ă -vis the word of the courts.

The debate itself was held in spite of and in contradiction of the Court of Appeal (CA) upholding writs of certiorari and Prohibition petitioned for by the Chief Justice, where the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) appointed under and in terms of Standing Order 78A was determined not to have legal power or authority to find anything that affects the legal rights of the CJ. The court thereby quashed the report of the PSC.  The CA in fact refereed the larger question of constitutional interpretation to the Supreme Court (SC), which had ruled that 78A violates the constitution.  The other elements of the petition (bias, deviousness etc.) the CA did not have to determine on, therefore. 

The above, then, can be described as the butt-ends of parallel processes where the legal muscles of the relevant lines tested themselves against one another.

Processes are never clinical. People and interests are naturally parts of the story. Rhetoric has a say. Words are used. In high profile cases the stakes are high, not just for the protagonists but their hangers-on and anyone and everyone who senses that there are morsels or even something more substantial to be lapped up if the cookie crumbles their way. There has been, therefore, much vilification across the board.

The charges against the CJ are serious to the point that those against Neville Samarakoon seem utterly trivial. Details of her bank accounts and activity therein warrant, in the very least, query of post-suitability. Details of the Trillium transaction and related discounts indicate infringement of Article 110(2) of the Constitution, ‘No Judge of the Supreme Court or Court of appeal shall perform any other office (whether paid or not) or accept any place of profit or emolument, except as authorized by the Constitution or by written law or with the consent of the President.’ Financial experts would maintain that the term discount indicated loss to the seller and profit to the purchaser. ‘Gift’ is indicated. As such the legality of the move notwithstanding decisions regarding the bench hearing the relevant case raises serious questions of objectivity and dignity of office.  Allegation needs to be proved, though.  For such, there should be provision.  The CA determination leaves one to conclude that there are none. 

Many who have opposed the impeachment process have studiously sidestepped such issues, choosing instead to focus on matters of moral authority and perceptions of vindictiveness, both of which can be argued cogently. Political readings where logic is mixed with selectivity make heady cocktails. Allegation can be read as vindictive finger-pointing and this can be confronted by finger pointing in return. For every single matter on which the CJ’s behavior is questioned, one could argue, similar queries can be directed at her detractors.  The politics of convenience, therefore, marked the process from the beginning to end.

That kind of politicization could have been avoided, if for example the process was a product of separate investigations, subject to the caveat that nothing can stop objectors crying ‘foul’ and alleging premeditation. It could have been minimized if process was not padded by a campaign to ‘educate’ the public. It can be argued also, that such efforts may have fed into the interests of those who have an axe to grind against the regime, spurring frenzied commentary about attacks on the independence of the judiciary, dictatorial tendency. The notion ‘international conspiracy’ naturally acquired currency.

It was not a matter of determining guilt or innocence, as far as the CA was concerned, but rather one of propriety.  If 78A is unconstitutional, then it should be transformed into an Act of Parliament, the constitutionality of which the SC has to determine.  Parliament, in such an eventuality, could have insisted that the incumbent CJ should absent herself from the inconsistency check, since we were in impeachment mid-stream. At this point, Parliament would have been forced to assume the integrity of the bench, whose ‘independence’ is clouded by the composition of the Judicial Services Commission, the Chairperson of which is the CJ herself, ex-officio.  ‘Mid-process,’ however, is the rhetorician’s ‘home turf’.  That’s where ‘foul’ is heard the loudest.  Given the degree of politicization, sobriety would have been obtained dearly for suspicion is at a peak and egos at risk of disintegration. 

The fact of the matter is, without 78A and until such time some new measure is introduced, the 1978 Constitution would remain one where there are no provisions whatsoever to oust an errant judge of the higher courts.  That’s an unacceptable state of affairs.  Introducing something now would set a bad precedent, but one could argue that there’s no choice but to do so. 

Those who object to the CA determination can argue that judicial review is never conferred in the abstract or in every conceivable situation. Permissibility is detailed. Powers are caveated with limitations. They can also state that constitutional provisions for ousting of judges of the Supreme and Appellate courts in countries that subscribe to the Latimer House Principles have applied them only to the subordinate judiciary. In both Britain and Australia, Parliament has close to absolute power in determining the ways and means of impeaching judges of the higher courts, noting however that both countries have second chambers which are less about political parties. 

The problem is that review of impeachment measures was not done when they had to be done and were neglected when necessity was pointed out.  Queen’s Counsel Nadesan’s submissions on the matter in his defense of Justice Samarakoon is almost three decades old, so few can claim that no one noticed. Bandaranaike, Muttetuwegama and Gunawardena (of the PSC relevant to that process), in their dissent, urged sending the matter to the SC for a determination.  Nothing was done and so the flaw remained.

On the other hand, those objecting to the CA ruling could claim that Article 107 (3) gives Parliament the option of providing procedure for impeachment either by Law or by Standing Order.  The Legislature can perforce choose to ignore determinations of the judiciary, they would argue, contending that the ruling traverses the jurisdiction and powers of the Legislature. They would, like their objectors, refer principles of power separation.   

It is then the lack of clarity regarding the separation of powers that makes for multiple interpretations. This is why political convenience is enjoying a field day. This is why, regardless of the seriousness of allegation and the guilt or innocence of the accused, it is possible for all protagonists to present cogent expositions of respective positions.

For all these reasons, it is objectively impossible to salute one or the other of the interpretations as ‘true’, ‘valid’ and/or ‘overriding’. When one or other is upheld as ‘The Relevancy’, what is in fact being asserted is political preference and/or political objection, propriety being a convenience, an alibi shaped by preferred outcomes.

As things stand, the President (who is both Executive and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) has the power to give effect to the Parliament’s determination, by word and if necessary deed (of enforcement). The President can, in the name of the people and dignity of the post of Chief Justice, go ahead to sack her and appoint a successor. This, however, will not untie the interpretive conundrum pertaining to the matter of ousting judges of higher courts. Just as erring on the side of the Court of Appeal determination would not indicate a superior-anterior positioning of judiciary and legislature respectively, this course of action would not make Supreme Court slave to Parliamentary master forever, even though precedent is a powerful referent and ally in the machinations of the pernicious.

The statesmanlike option would be to desist, not out of deference to interpretive superiority of the Court of Appeal or fear of possible censure by unfriendly movers and shakers in the international community and consequent political discomfiture, but because CJ, impeachment and constitutional conundrum are trivial to someone who has vision and has the larger and sustainable interests of the country at heart.

This is perhaps a moment for deep and sober executive reflection. The President may, if he so chooses, declare that inasmuch as he (let us say) respects the determination of the Parliament and inasmuch as he (let us say) finds error in the court determination, he recognizes that a serious constitutional flaw exists, one which blurs dangerously the boundaries that separate the three branches of government. He can add that moreover the 1978 Constitution has many other errors, including those pertaining to checks and balances, those of transparency and accountability in particular. He can therefore declare that this crisis (as some brand it) calls not for amendment but overhaul. The matter of infusing clarity and robustness and moreover dignity to appointment processes, positions themselves and ousting procedures would be thereby resolved but only as part of a larger and necessary process of elevating the constitutional document to one consistent with democracy, in spirit, in word and deed.

['The Nation' editorial, January 13, 2013]