We can now look back without anger….

‘Victory’ is made of names.  It comes to claimants.  It has many fathers.  Collective remembrance is selective, because there is a political economy of memory.  Personal recollection rarely leaves individuals out, they die and live thereafter in the vast territories of personal loss, desolate landscapes scattered with unanswerable questions across which sweep the indescribable sighs of could-have-been.

  

The commanders are not forgotten and should not be either.   Less frequently mentioned but more resistant to forgetting than the vast majority who died, are the exceptionally brave.  Among them, of course, is Corporal Gamini Kularatne of Hasalaka, better known as Hasalaka Gamini, who single-handedly thwarted an LTTE assault on Elephant Pass by jumping into an advancing attack vehicle and blowing himself up. 

There was Captain Saliya Upul Aladeniya, who stopped an entire armoury falling into the hands of the terrorists by exploding it and himself.  Colonel Fazli Lafeer, Major Jayanath Ginimelage, Lieutenant Thilak Nissanka and others who saw death in the face and embraced it without a second thought in order to save their fellow fighting men, are still recalled when the word ‘hero’ is mentioned.

They did not win it all for the nation by themselves.  Every man and woman who went to the frontlines, defended villages and villagers, patrolled the seas and supported from the skies, contributed.  So too all those who countered the myths about the LTTE’s invincibility, those who placed faith in a political leadership that was determined to fight the good fight to the end, and everyone who with word or deed boosted troop morale  must be counted among those who contributed. 

On the other hand, heroism is not the preserve of the victors.  If the LTTE proved hard to defeat for thirty years, it is not only because of political machinations by outside forces, treachery on the part of various key military and political figures and relentless myth-making about LTTE-invincibility by vile academics, NGO personalities and so-called ‘peace-activists’.  It was also because there was heroism among the LTTE cadres.  Whether the struggle was justified or not, whether they were brainwashed or not, whether they were maniacal or not, the fact remains that the courage and sacrifice some of the LTTE cadres demonstrated is equal to that demonstrated by the best in the Sri Lankan fighting forces.  Heroism, then, has no caste, creed, race, ethnicity or religious affiliation. Hero is hero; heroine is heroine. 

Wars are made of heroes.  They are made of victims.  People died.  Close to a hundred thousand perished, either in combat or as victims of suicide attacks, bomb explosions, assassinations, deliberate fire while fleeing, crossfire and indiscriminate attacks, the last especially in the early years of the conflict.

They were all citizens of this country, even if some of them denounced ‘nation’ and demanded and fought for a separate country.  They all looked like you and I.  They all had families, friends and loved ones.  They were all imperfect, but there’s nothing to say that they were all unworthy of remembrance, undeserving of empathy or sympathy or even admiration, if not for the cause, but the sacrifice and bravery demonstrated in fighting for it. 

It is three years now since the fighting ceased.  In the three years that have passed, those who did not envisage nor wanted the war-end outcome, those whose economic and political interests are not served by a stable political climate and other spoilers have spared no pains to misrepresent what happened and how it happened.  They’ve played down the miseries forced upon Tamil civilians by an intransigent LTTE and by Prabhakaran’s inflated ego.  They’ve deliberately fudged numbers.  They’ve taken out context.  They’ve forgotten the immense sacrifices made by the security forces in order to bring to safety some 300,000 civilians held hostage by the LTTE.  They have no eyes for exemplary humanism demonstrated by these same forces during and after the final days of the conflict.  They have retired their intelligence and ability to compare and contrast, i.e. the Sri Lankan situation with that of other conflicts, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. 

The displaced have been resettled.  They’ve not moved back into mansions.  They are not without problems.  But then again, they can step out without fear of losing leg and life to landmine.  Parents can send their children to school without wondering if the LTTE would or would not abduct them and push them into a war they don’t want or are ready to be in.  They have roads.  Hospitals.  Schools.  Medicine. They have hope.  And, if it matters, their situation is better than that of certain Sinhalese and Muslims in other areas unaffected by the clash of arms but not spared by a political economy of development skewed against certain regions. 

There was a time when politics was gun-made and elections mere exercises in dictate-following, if voting was allowed at all by the LTTE, that is. Today there is representation.  Elected representation.  Back then, there was silent acquiescence.  Now there is vocal protest.  Back then, a monologue. Today, a dialogue.  Back then, one man’s voice; today, conversations.  Back then, there was darkness; today a determined electrification effort that has brought light and other benefits to thousands of homes.  Back then, there were ‘combatants’ deprived of schooling, childhood and a future, forced to learn how to shoot and kill, made to shoot and kill; today the vast majority of them have reintegrated into their communities as civilians, empowered with education and marketable skills. 

There was a time when Colombo was a besieged city, a time when the entire country was paralyzed by threat of terrorist attack.  That was a time when the barricades and checkpoints that dotted the cityscape were mirrored in the consciousness of being, sorry, surviving. 

That’s all gone now.

Today, we are not yet the reconciled polity that we would all like to be, but we are far more closer to that place than we were in May 2009.  Today we can ask for ‘grievance without the frills of political expedience’ and the aggrieved cannot say ‘first let’s have a ceasefire’.  Today the aggrieved can say ‘let’s talk’, and the Government cannot say ‘get your boys to stop attacks on civilian targets’.  Today there is space. Back then, there was not. 

Today, there is one place that no citizen with any desire for peace and life would want to revisit: the 30 or so years that came before May 18, 2009.   And that, I believe, ladies and gentlemen, is something that we can be happy about, something we can and perhaps should celebrate.  In the name of all those who died, all those who suffered, all those who did not arrive at this ‘today’ and those who must inhabit the long ‘tomorrow’ of post May 18, 2009 Sri Lanka. 

[First published in 'The Nation' on May 22, 2012]

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Fonseka-Sampanthan pact shows Butenis' slip

A few days ago, www.colombotelegraph.com broke the news that Sarath Fonseka had signed a secret pact with R. Sampanthan, the leader of the Tamil National Alliance.  It was always known that the Fonseka camp had come to some agreement with the TNA during the 2010 Presidential Campaign.  What was not made public was the full text of the pact. 

The key member parties of that coalition, the UNP and the JVP have remained silent about these revelations, culled from Wikileaks files, subsequently clearly painstakingly perusalby the ‘colombotelegraph’ people.  It is hard to believe that the JVP, for instance, did not know the details of this agreement.  If they did, then the question arises why they did not share the information with the voting public.  If they didn’t know then that speaks volumes about their political immaturity and ignorance. 

On the other hand, it is well known that politicians rarely bother about the nitty-gritty of manifestos and policy declarations.  That’s just necessary frill for real intent, which is power-need.  If, as can be argued, the UNP and JVP knew from the beginning that they were backing a losing cause out of sheer lack of options, then the fact of pact would not have even warranted discussion.  The fact that the agreement was essentially one of confederacy, is therefore only of academic interest.  What I found more compelling about this ‘leak’ and others related to the 2010 Presidential Election is the thinking of the USA, as articulated by that country’s representative in Sri Lanka, Patricia Butenis. 

The communiqués to Washington from the office of the US Ambassador, carrying her signature, are not cursory reports of political developments.  The selectivity and emphasis contained in them indicate political preferences. 

The fact that the Sampanthan-Fonseka agreement found its way to the US Embassy and not the voting public indicates the true location of Fonseka’s (and by association, the UNP’s and JVP’s) political home was and is.  It indicates that the USA had a huge stake in Fonseka’s bid while the track record of interfering in the politics of other countries makes it difficult to assume that support did not include funds and promises. 

Butenis’ comments make sad reading, actually.  A tendency to take seriously the calculations of those who allowed reason to be discoloured by hope may have given the lady reasons re entertain (cautious) hope herself, it reflects poorly on her status as a senior diplomat.  Sampathan’s confessions, for example, have persuaded her to believe that ‘a Fonseka victory appears more possible each day’.  This was the crux of her statement on January 1, 2010. Earlier, on November 10, 2009, Butenis makes much of Sampanthan saying that a Rajapaksa/Fonseka content would split the army and that the election campaign would get ‘hot’. 

Although clearly at odds with the JVP’s stated ideological preferences (she says they are opportunists and were revenge-seekers – January 15, 2010), Butenis salivates about the Tilvin-Somawansa faction of the JVP splitting from the ruling coalition to support Fonseka.  She doesn’t note, for example, the fact that the JVP’s start rhetorician, Wimal Weerawansa backed Mahinda Rajapaksa or that the JVP had suffered huge losses in popularity after the party left the coalition. 

Butenis acknowledges that Fonseka’s soft-hands and weak-kneed relationship with the US might have some negative fallout, lamenting that he could have been more discreet about his dealings with US authorities (November 6, 2009 communiqué).   The role of the US in Fonseka’s campaign is also evidenced by the fact that Fonseka treated Butenis as a key confidante with whom he shared all plans including a desire to travel to Singapore and stay there, after he lost the election (January 28, 2010 communiqué). 

I believe that the account of a meeting with Sunimal Fernando (one of President Rajapaksa’s numerous ‘advisors’ – ‘hangers-on’ would be a better tag) is what shows Butenis up most.  Fernando, well-known for survival footwork and hardly the pollster he (and Butenis) claims he is, was clearly hedging his bets when he a) met with US Embassy officials, and b) dubbed the race ‘statistically a dead heat’.  Butenis cannot be expected to have the math skills necessary to read the Sri Lankan polity and Fernando would not be asked to read it by anyone who has any sense.  Butenis, obviously ignorant about Fernando’s abilities, has fired a communiqué to Washington quoting Fernando (January 22, 1010 communiqué) and without taking the trouble to check with people who knew better.  The sheer eagerness indicates political preferences and sophomoric intellect.  Sad.
As hilarious is the fact that Butenis took former President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s observations seriously enough to quote her in a communiqué.  Her incompetence is well documented, as are her shady deals and utter disregard for democratic practices.  Her objections on these matters are therefore laughable.  Butenis must have been thrilled to bits that Kumaratunga said Fonseka would win. As a responsible official of the US Government, though, one would have thought she gives a reasonable amount of context so that claim can be properly assessed.  Kumaratunga’s opinions are not taken seriously in Sri Lanka.  She could have mentioned this, but did not. 

I am sure www.colombotelegraph.com will meticulously peruse relevant documents from Wikileaks. I believe that other documents from the US Embassy in Colombo will only confirm Patricia Butenis’ incompetence and further entrench the perception that she is a meddler who does little to improve relations between the USA and Sri Lanka. 

[Courtesy, 'The Nation', November 6, 2011]

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Asset declaration by candidates necessary but not sufficient

A question is put to John Reed (played by Warren Beatty) in ‘Reds’, the classic film based on Reed’s authoritative account of the Russian Revolution, ‘Ten Days that Shook the World’: ‘Mr Reed, what do you think this war is about?’  Reed, a well-known journalist who had just returned to New York after covering the Mexican Revolution for the Metropolitan Magazine and the war referred to was World War I.  Reed stood up and the audience attending the lavish dinner party fell silent, expecting a profound analysis.  He offered a one-word answer: ‘profit!’

Had John Reed been asked what politics is about today he might give the same answer.  Profit.  Money. Making-money.  A lot of money.  That’s what politics is about once manifestos are forgotten, posters and cut-outs removed, leaflets recycled and rhetoric becomes a dim memory.  Candidates and parties spend millions of rupees to boost image and convince the voters that they and they alone can solve their burning problems.  They are all honest, clean, skillful, energetic and wise.  Or so they claim.  If all this was true then we would be living in a perfect society and in physical and social landscapes devoid of crime, squalor, wastage, preventable diseases and wastage.  We do not, alas!

If it was only about empty rhetoric that is soon forgotten and non-delivery of promises, it would still be sufferable. The truth is that for all the grand claims and pronouncements, not only does nothing concrete materialize by way of enhancing the overall well-being of the population.  Why then should anyone contest?  If they were honest and if they realize they just cannot deliver, they could admit incompetence and resign or at least choose not to re-contest.  This hardly ever happens.  We are forced to conclude, given the fact that the salaries and other legal benefits of holding office are insignificant compared with amounts spent on campaigns, that Reed’s observation is eminently applicable to politicians.

Politics is like a special machine where someone who looks pious, well-meaning, sincere and capable goes in and a fat, arrogant, self-satisfied and wealthy individual comes out.  The arrogance and body shape can be forgiven, but not wealth-accumulation.  Not in a democracy that can claim to be ‘functional’. 

It is in this context that a recent statement made by the Elections Commissioner, Mahinda Desapriya regarding asset declaration by candidates needs to be examined carefully.  Mr. Desapriya has sought powers to disqualify any candidate failing to declare assets prior to submitting nominations.  He states that while most candidates had complied with the requirement, some are yet to come clean. 

What is important, however, is not mere asset declaration but a meticulous examination of declaration to test for falsification.  If the relevant laws do not require honesty in declaration and the powers to verify claim, and if there are no legal mechanisms to assess assets acquired while in office, then obtaining asset-declaration is nothing more than eyewash. 

It has to be kept in mind that crooks are resourceful creatures and tend to have a better understanding of the law than the average citizen and as such are generally educated about all the loopholes as well.  There are many ways to hide assets and many ways to explain wealth acquisition, after all.  As things stand, unless the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption makes a move, elected candidate just move on to the next election.  In the very least, there is no mechanism to note differences in asset endowment of candidates up for re-election and therefore no queries seeking explanation for difference if any.

What is required then is a more robust set of laws so that politics ceases to be another name for profiteering through commissions, favours and bribes. What is required also is a proper and independent auditing mechanism.  Most importantly, what is required is hawk-eye vigilance on the part of the citizenry.  It must be noted that unfortunately a culture has developed where the voter expect the voted to make bucks after being elected.  This is a ‘par for the course’ that helps make the general voting population deserving of the kinds of governments and representatives they get saddled with post-election. 

If the public is complacent, then the crooks who see politics as buck-making vocation cannot be expected to be on their toes, forget about enacting laws that would inhibit such operations.    

The Elections Commissioner has not laid it out as thick as the general public would like, but he’s come out and said something that needed to be said.  It is brave of him and he needs to be supported at all levels and by all stakeholders.  If this is not done we will continue to caricature novice parliamentarians and other elected representatives as scrawny hopefuls who, with time, are drawn as smug and obnoxious fatties.  The people will laugh but the politicians will continue to have the last laugh.  It will continue to be raucous and unpalatable, and will extend the validity of Reedesque comment regarding the purpose of politics, namely, ‘profit’. 

[Read 'The Nation'; the above is the editorial, October 30, 2011] 

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A note on the history-phobia of devolutionists

‘It takes centuries of life to make a little history; it takes centuries of history to make a little tradition.’ – Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan

The term ‘power sharing’ (like its typically recommended, on-the-ground articulation, ‘devolution’) has been used for a long time in the Sri Lankan political discourse, especially in the context of resolving what are called ‘minority grievances’. 

Now ‘devolution’ can be argued for outside of ethnic politics as well -- for example in discussions of development, better distribution of wealth, greater degrees of participation in decision-making processes etc.  On the other hand, there is nothing to state that the objectives relevant to these other arguments can only be obtained through devolution.  Better structures of governance and decentralization of administrative functions can do the same job.  As for ‘development’, the current thinking on relevant economics actually rebels against ‘devolution’. Indeed, in the Sri Lankan context, the devolution argument, when played to its logical conclusion, can result in exacerbating regional disparities. 

While many devolutionists have alluded to economic and governance factors (selectively and erroneously), these have been little more than addendum to the principal argumentative thrust, i.e. resolution of issues pertaining to the ‘ethnic’, in particular the grievances/aspirations of the Tamil community.  This in turn is predicated on two claims/assumptions: the notion of a ‘traditional homeland’ and demographic realities pertaining to ‘ethnic concentrations’.  The former necessitates a reference to and substantiation in terms of historical evidence.  The latter, often framed in terms of a description of Sri Lanka as a ‘multi-ethnic’ and ‘multi-religious’ country, necessitates a discussion of relevant numbers and demographic data.  On both counts, the advocates of devolution appear to fumble and tongue-tied. 

Let’s begin with the numbers.  First of all, in today’s world of massive demographic shifts within and without countries and continents, there are no pure mono-ethnic nations. The only mono-religious state would be the Vatican.  Thus the notions of multi-ethnic and multi-religious often amount to gross misrepresentation. Moreover, leaving them unpacked in terms of numbers indicates political and ideological sleight of hand.  Interestingly, though, the devolution advocates who use these terms liberally also talk of ‘majoritarianism’.  That term ought to be followed by a demographic breakdown but devolutionists are consistently loath to engage in any such exercise.  They don’t do this and one wonders if this is because the term implies that there’s something more than one-collective-one-vote in these things that have the ‘multi’ tag. 

 

When they do talk numbers and demography the discussion almost exclusively focuses either on ‘status quo’ or charges of deliberate attempts to alter the same through racism-motivated colonization.  There are three problems with hooking the number issue onto ‘status quo’. First, it assumes that people are born and die without moving around at all.  Today’s ‘status quo’ was not yesterday’s and will not be tomorrow’s and as such ‘resolution’ of ‘grievances’ relative to ethnic-enclave based status quo demands re-resolution each time the compositions get altered.  Secondly, ‘status quo’ by definition rebels against history and summarily throws out all arguments about ‘traditional homelands’ since this is a notion that is embedded inextricably in things historical and not ‘momentary’.  A third objection would be that the ‘multi-ethnic, multi-religious’ essentially calls for an erasure of citizenship anomalies across the board.  One cannot demand this and also want a privileging of certain collectives over another in a given territorial unit.  Devolutionists consistently gloss over these issues and this indicates a rank disavowal of fact and reason and thereby an unholy deference to myth, obfuscation, error and crass communal politics.

The question of ‘history’ is as interesting. Ask anyone who talks of traditional homelands how far back in history he/she wants to go. Ask him/her about substantiating claim.  Clamming up, shifting gear and diverting attention usually follow.  It is remarkable how those who strongly advocate devolution and liberally use terms such as ‘traditional homeland’, ‘self-determination’, ‘power-sharing,’ etc. are also extremely reluctant to talk about the history of this country.  We often here statements such as ‘the past is all over, let’s focus on the present’ uttered by devolutionists, even as they use history-laden terms such as ‘traditional homelands’.

It is no coincidence that the vast majority of those who get intellectually fidgety with respect to the above happen to be non-Sinhalese or non-Buddhists or else subscribe to apparently identity-less or identity-disavowing ideologies such as Marxism or at least have had their political baptism in such doctrines. 

The length of historical memory preferred indicates political location, ideological bent, preferred outcome and of course the defensible claim on historical time in terms of the particular individual’s ethno-religious identity.   Those who don’t have the ‘centuries’ relevant to Dr. Radhakrishna’s observation above cannot afford to talk history. They can, at best, fudge it (by tagging ‘multi’ to the ethnic and religious) or take it out of the equation by talking ‘present’ and ‘status quo’ (and of course fiddling with the curriculum as was quite effectively done in the nineties).  Without the centuries and the histories not much ‘tradition’ can be made except of course in the fly-by-night, one-hit-wonder kind of formulation that simply cannot replace ‘tradition’ made of way-of-life, cultural ethos and artifact-reality that show undeniable longevity and resilience.  An ‘I was here’ fact of an odd artifact or mention in a verse has very little historical weight and perhaps this is why the historically light would rather not talk about it.

No nation can move towards a better future if it is stuck in the past.  On the other hand, a nation that disavows the past, is destined to walk into trap and confusion.  Only clarity and a certain deference to reason, both about the past and present, can produce useful thinking when it comes to thinking about the future.  A greater claim on the past does not and should not translate automatically into greater citizenship privileges, but a reluctance to acknowledge that past and the who-did-what of civilization-building, it must also be acknowledged, is a recipe for communal disharmony.  If Community A, whose history is two days old, tells Community B whose history is 17 centuries old that history never happened and even if it did happen it is no longer relevant, no one can fault Community B for treating Community A with suspicion.  If Community B tells Community A, ‘we made this country, so you have to live with the fact and moreover submit to us,’ the Community B cannot claim to have acquired any civilization worth talking about.

History-Phobia is not healthy. It reveals pernicious design. History-Fixation is also unhealthy.  History-disavowal is a malicious project that seeks to erase ‘centuries of life’.  It is good to be clear on these things.  The more we try to hide history under the political carpet, the more untenable becomes the matter of inter-communal embrace on a common humanitarian floor.  We would all trip and fall flat on our faces.  We’ve done that enough now.  It is time to acknowledge fact and toss myth out.   It is time to name those who are reluctant to do this as political frauds, racists and chauvinists, and in some instances religious fundamentalists who for their so-called evangelical ‘mission’ fervently seek the erasure that the ‘multi’ tag gives, a kind of politics they would never ever advocate in countries where the particular faith is dominant.  The reason why this last category champions devolution, perhaps, is the knowledge that when you pull the rug from under the Sinhalese (in terms of land-theft for example), the vast majority of those who fall will necessarily be Buddhists. 

We are history-made.  That’s the bottom line.  Anyone who denies this denies instantly his/her parents. To begin with.  He/she then calls his/her child a bastard.  That’s also ‘bottom line’.

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The JVP's identity crisis

The results of the 2010 General Election floored a lot of people, especially the JVP which suffered the biggest losses in terms of reduced numbers in Parliament.  From some 41 seats secured in 2004 courtesy of support from the SLFP voters in 2004, that party slid to the single digits, hooking up with Sarath Fonseka’s fledgling party saving the blushes.  That was in-your-face signal to engage in identity-seek.

The JVP is officially ‘left’, politically, and officially ‘Marxist’ in ideology.  Its actions over the past 40 odd years would however not fail to raise the eyebrows of Marxists and Leftists, considering the party’s many about-turns, flirtations with the Right and faith in terrorism (as evidenced in the JVP’s 1971 and 1988-89 avatars).  The 2010 result was an ideal reflection-call.  The JVP had tried armed insurrection before.  It had tried to piggy-back on nationalism.  It had gone the way of the Old Left (coalition-politics) and arrived at the same dead-end.  It was time to rethink.

Those in the party would of course know best, but like all Left-claiming organizations the JVP too had its divisions and among them the one between the hardliners and the take-things-easy types, the middle-roaders if you will.  Egos would have played in the party’s leadership equation, I am sure, and so too questions over priorities: party interest vs. national interest in times of threat to nation.

The JVP’s in-party face would know whether or not things played according to script, but it is pretty clear that the party’s political fortunes slipped after leaving the UPFA and took a nose-dive after siding with the UNP to support the ‘common’ presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka. 

There’s always been talk of a ‘rahas’ (secretive) or ‘hora’ (clandestine) leadership hidden from the public eye, with Premakumar Gunaratnam as chief.  We don’t know for sure what the tensions were, but it’s all out now.  The public-face leadership and the hidden-face leadership are clearly at each other’s throats.  Little is known of Gunaratnam, younger brother of that exemplary, multi-talented, much-loved leader of the Inter University Students Federation in the eighties, Ranjithan, except that he didn’t share any of his older brother’s qualities and that he had one that his brother had not: a strong arm.  Ranjithan, moreover, was a nationalist and would never pander to separatist posturing for political gain.  Premakumar is a throw-back to the Lionel Bopage faction within the JVP: Eelamist.   At least this is what we can conclude from what’s being said regarding the recent fracture. 

Premakumar’s hardliners would think nothing of causing political instability if it helps the re-positioning of the party and making it more ‘relevant’ in national politics.  One must understand that relevancy does not imply a positive; the LTTE was also ‘relevant’ in that it had to be taken into account in political decision-making.  These are the types who would brush aside the deaths of tens of thousands that might be the price of relevancy as ‘can’t help’.  That’s political irresponsibility.

On the other hand, the Gunaratnam faction or any other group within that party does have a case when it comes to party identity.  The JVP, all things considered, has been a thene-hetiyata-ane (pick the nail to suit the spot) kind of party, i.e. opportunistic and even describable as populist. Most positions taken have been justified by calling it ‘strategic repositioning’ or some such thing.  That’s ok.  All parties do that.  That’s what power politics is all about, ideology being mostly frill.  The problem seems to be the realization that the composite has no integrity and is therefore running the risk of being everything and therefore nothing. 

In this sense, this ‘split’ would be a good thing for the party, although what’s good for the JVP (or any other party) is not necessarily good for the country or the people.  In the very least, it would help the general public locate the JVP in the political firmament.  Think about it.  The JVP had run with the Rajapaksas, bedded with the UNP and hunted with Fonseka.  It helped Mahinda Rajapaksa into power, used the UPFA as a prop to have a bigger parliamentary presence, saved the UPFA at the budget vote, played CIA-agent when that was thought to be convenient, abandoned principles, picked up gun, engaged in terrorism, condemned other terrorisms and helped defeat such tyrannies, echoed Eelamist rhetoric, rejected devolution, etc., and now there’s one faction calling for the affirmation of nationalism while another indulges in Eelam-speak.  That’s hodge-podge for you and more reminiscent of the UNP and SLFP than any ‘left’ organization that one can think of. 

We can’t predict the outcome of this ‘split’.  Given the gun-loving tendencies of the Premakumaras and the aversion of Somawansa Amarasinghe, Tilvin Silva and others to hide-and-seek, cloak-and-dagger politics, it is hard to think of amicable resolution.  Questions of legality are likely to play a role in yielding some kind of boldly outlined outcome.   If the moderates win out, the hardliners would have to (happily?) retreat to the jungles.  If the hardliners prevail, the moderates will have to form a party of their own and play an insignificant Old Left type role in the democratic space.  Either way, something definite is likely to emerge in terms of JVP-identity. 

Anyone taking the jungle path, particularly at this point, would only be playing into the hands of the salivating outsiders plotting and/or hoping for political upheavals that would help get them toe-hold in the island or else turn toe-hold into assertive presence.  The regime cannot be expected to lie down and die.  Gun-picking would script blood-letting into the political process.  That would be tragic indeed.  This side of such an eventuality, however, is where political cogency exists.  That’s not a bad thing for a political organization, up-down-and-confused though its history might be. 

We are in for interesting times, either way.  ‘Interesting’ is, unfortunately, not necessarily blood-free.  There is nothing intrinsically bad about being radical.  Maturity and a sense of responsibility would be good.  Wisdom to envisage outcome and therefore avoid unnecessary violence would be great.  We still don’t know how the JVP biscuit is going to crumble but the architects and beneficiaries of the crumbling ought to be adult about things.  The JVP’s history doesn’t make one hopeful, but we can play the wait and see game. 

However, it is a tad too late in the day for that party to have growing pains and be indulged as a result.  This should not be forgotten.

[Courtesy, 'The Nation', September 25, 2011]

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So will you vote for a polluter?

Mohanlal Grero, it is reported, was upset about the impending elections for the Dehiwala-Galkissa Municipal Council.  He wanted the United National Party to keep the issue of who would be mayor open in the event of the party emerging victorious.  In other words, he was opposed to the idea of a ‘Mayor/Mayoress Designate’.   He had threatened to quit as Party Organizer if his demands were not met.  Now he says that four out of five demands have been met and the quit-threat would not be revisited until after the election was over.



Richard Pathirana and Amarasiri Dodangoda are no more, but the polluting culture they like thousands of others helped perpetuate lives on



Notably, the party leadership had not backed down on the key contention, merely assuring the aggrieved Ratmalana Organizer of the party that the Mayor Designate, if elected, would not harm the interests of the Ratmalana voters.   It is reported that this ‘successful’ conclusion of discussions was met with wild cheering and firecrackers. 

Meanwhile, most of the good ladies and gentlemen of all parties contesting the election, have demonstrated their commitment to the city whose operations they hope to oversee.  They’ve plastered the walls of private and public properties with posters.  The electorate wakes to a set of faces and a few hours later gets to see another bunch of mug shots.  Come evening, these are duly replaced by yet another bunch of Good Samaritans who believe the citizens owe them something. 

This is not new.  Elections are made of posters.  Thousands upon thousands of trees have to be cut to make the paper that is used for posters.  Some of the candidates even have the gumption to promise the voter a clean environment in the event they get elected.  Not just in Dehiwala-Galkissa, of course. 

These are local government elections.  The key word is ‘local’.  Only those who are resident in the relevant geography can contest.  If a resident needs a poster to tell his neighbours that he/she is contesting, then he/she must have been pretty much absent from the community and therefore cannot claim to know what the issues are or have solutions for the problems requiring immediate attention.  If a candidate must necessarily indulge in pollution to win some votes so that he/she can arrest pollution (for example), then that candidate is not deserving of your vote.  Also, if that candidate wins, then the voters should not complain if they find that their waste disposal problem remains unaddressed, if their children die of Dengue and other diseases that pollution and squalor help spread. 

The Colombo Municipal area has been spared all that.  So far.  Perhaps this is because the ongoing city beautification process has made people see that a clean city is not as Utopian as was thought to be and politicians, consequently, don’t want to rub the voter the wrong way with posters, cut-outs and other campaign paraphernalia.  They don’t want, perhaps, to be identified as eye-sore producers and promoters.

If this is possible in Colombo, then it is not impossible elsewhere.  It is easy to blame the candidates, but we must understand that there is a demand-supply principle in operation in the matter of electioneering.  Champika Ranawaka and Udaya Gammanpila ran effective poster-free campaigns at the General Election and Provincial Council Election respectively and were among those who polled the most preferential votes.  They were exceptions, however.    Duminda Silva won handsomely in Colombo at the General Election, even though it seemed he would not spare a single wall or lamppost.  Wimal Weerawansa was as poster-fixated.  They finished on top.  Those who finished first in all districts were similarly poster inclined.  Polluters all, yes, but we must not forget that they were rewarded nevertheless. 

It would be nice if residents came out and said, ‘poster boys and girls will not get my vote’, but people are risk-averse (as they ought to be!).   You don’t have to shout about it though.  There’s generally one or two people who either out of choice or circumstances (lack of campaign cash, for example) leave walls alone.  Every party has a few I-shall-not-pollute candidates.   If the party of choice has no one like that then it is probably time to question the worth of supporting that particular party.  It is far better to spoil your vote or at least stay at home on election day. 

As for Mohanlal Grero and the UNP, they seem to have missed the bus. It’s not about whether Sunethra Ranasinghe is good or bad.  Well, I suppose it’s important for them.  There are more pressing issues and they are all pasted on the walls.  Strange they didn’t have the eyes to see.

[Courtesy, Daily News, September 1, 2011]

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