‘Elpitiya’ as beginning and end

Elections to every single local government authority in the Galle District were held on February 10, 2018. Except Elpitiya. That was due to a petition by the United National Party (UNP) pleading relief over perceived error in their nomination list being rejected. Time passed. We had the parliamentary crisis at the end of that year. We had the Easter Sunday attacks a few months ago. Even people who were aware of that election or rather non-election forgot about Elpitiya. 

Not any longer. With the court directing the Elections Commission to hold elections for the Elpitiya Pradeshiya Sabhava immediately, we are seeing a rehearsal, a by-election of sorts and a referendum all rolled into one.  

Here’s what happened. The yahapalanaya regime went into strange contortions to postpone local government elections. Well, provincial councils too, but that’s another story. By the time elections were called, the yahapalana coalition had cracked. Corruption, nepotism and incompetence had become too apparent to hide. The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) was the clear victor. President Sirisena’s true strength was revealed (the Sri Lanka Freedom Party [SLFP] got less than 15% of the vote and the UNP’s vote bank had dwindled to around 30%. 

The outlook for the yahapalana group is bleak. The SLFP or rather Maithripala Sirisena would be forced to take a stand, i.e. whether to enter into a coalition with the SLPP, tag itself to the UNP (or a faction of that party led by Sajith Premadasa, if the internal crisis is not resolved) or go it alone. Unenviable. The JVP was not officially a member of the yahapalana coalition, but stood with Sirisena and later the UNP against Mahinda Rajapaksa and later the SLFP-SLPP ‘arrangement’ during the parliamentary crisis a year ago. The JVP has decided to do their own thing this time around. The risk is their strength being revealed, but it’s a risk they’ve embraced, for better or worse.  

The UNP has spared no pains to paint President Sirisena as the villain of the piece called ‘Yahapalanaya.’ The UNP is still ‘government’. It is not opposition. It had mandate and responsibility. The UNP failed to deliver on all counts. The UNP is directly implicated in nepotism and corruption. The UNP marked itself as ‘incompetent.’ Ranil Wickremesinghe is the leader of this incompetent and corrupt UNP and Sajith Premadasa his lieutenant — no one can claim ‘I was a peon’ in the yahapalana regime.   

All these parties fared abysmally in February 2018. The SLPP secured 50.57% of the total vote in the Galle District, the UNP got 26.65%, the UPFA got 11.65% and the JVP 6.27%. 

The numbers may have changed. For the worse. Impatience with the regime may have enhanced rather than declined disenchantment for reasons of incompetence, incoherence and of course the scandalous failures on the security/intelligence front that led to the Easter Sunday attacks. There’s a strong likelihood that most of the 75,827 votes the UPFA received would slide towards the SLPP if the SLFP decides not to contest or have a pact with the UPFA. Even if the SLFP contests on its own, it is highly unlikely that it will retain the 11.65% share of February 2018. That could be halved or worse with ‘defection’ to the SLPP. 

And so we have ‘Elpitiya’. Is Elpitiya a microcosm of Sri Lanka? No. The Tamil and Muslim communities are negligible in Elpitiya. They won’t be in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in certain other parts of the country.  A UNP presidential candidate might be routed in Elpitiya (or in the Southern Province as a whole) but might win in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, although with a smaller margin than in 2015. 

Elpitiya is rural. Whereas the SLPP handsomely won all the pradesheeya sabhas in the Galle District, the UNP secured the Galle Municipal Council. In fact the UNP did better in the urban and municipal council elections than in the pradesheeya sabha elections in all parts of the country. 

This dissimilarity between the perceived urban and perceived rural gets smudged in important elections. For example, the tendency across the board was against the UNP in 1994 and clearly against Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015. In 2019, we might once again see a ‘unity’ of sorts between the urban and rural in terms of a common need to show the yahapalanists the political door.  

Regardless of these realities, the result will most certainly reflect voter sentiment. It will be read by the victor as a reflection of national sentiments, especially if the SLPP wins as expected. The losers would be forced to come up with elaborate statistical analyses to demonstrate that things could be different in a presidential race. Nevertheless, a rout in Elpitiya would severely demoralize, say, the UNP loyalist in Elpitiya-like electorates throughout the country and even in less Elpitiya-like places. The ‘urban’ areas, for example. It would cost the UNP candidate, whoever it may be.  Elpitiya, in short, would not only be read as ‘reflection’ of general sentiment, but would be a momentum giver and wrecker, to winner and loser(s) respectively. 

The SLPP is ready, obviously. The JVP always has its ‘people’ on the ground. The loyalists will vote as they always do, never mind that they have struggled to win over people outside the party. The SLFP’s identity crisis (migrate to the SLPP, play bystander, contest?) will be resolved, one way or the other, but the outcome is unlikely to propel the party into believing that fielding its own candidate makes any sense. The UNP will have to contest.

The UNP will have to decide on who will lead the party’s efforts in Elpitiya. Will Sajith be asked to ‘put out or shut up’? Will the party have resolved the candidate-issue by then? It is not an election that the UNP wants to contest, but it is an election the party cannot avoid. If the UNP loses by a small margin there will be positives to carry to the presidential election. Ranil (or Sajith or both) could spur the loyalists to work harder. If they lose by a margin similar to that of February 2018 and the party can obtain the consolation argument, ‘we have not lost ground.’ However, if the margin of defeat is greater than those related to the other pradesheeya sabha elections in the Galle District, the UNP will have to stomach ‘done and dusted’.  

Obviously, the SLPP cannot sit on February 2018 laurels either. If there’s gain, that locks up the presidential prize and if there’s the slightest decline, then it means the fat lady is yet to sing.  

Either way, Elpitiya could very well be the place where the presidential election begins and ends. For all these parties. 

malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com   

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Buds that (are said) to bloom

A bud is a metaphor and it is one that has naturally led to over-use because it is the party symbol of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the nelum pohottuwa. ‘The bud will bloom,’ they said with as much conviction as the rhetoricians of other parties predicted its withering. The results are out but the metaphor-play has not abated.  

Rajavarothiam  Sampanthan is the latest to have indulged. Speaking in Parliament, the veteran Tamil nationalist attacked former President Mahinda Rajapaksa conjuring up the specter of Eelam-creation in campaign rhetoric. He has a point.

Sampanthan said that Rajapaksa, as President, had talked of ‘maximum possible devolution,’ when he inaugurated the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). He mentioned also the ‘Experts Comittee’ appointed by Rajapaksa and led by Prof Tissa Vitharana. He noted that the report of this committee recommended reforms that went beyond the 13th Amendment. Of course Rajapaksa didn’t get excited about the APRC Report and Sampanthan didn’t mention this fact. On the other hand neither did he remind people that Rajapaksa had talked of ‘Thirteen Plus.’    

However, Sampanthan did mention that all the members of the Joint Opposition (which morphed into the pohottuwa so to speak) had unanimously supported the Resolution to turn Parliament into a Constitutional Assembly and had participated in the proceedings of the Steering Committee appointed thereof. Neither Rajapaksa nor anyone else talked of Eelam either in Parliament or in the Steering Committee, he quite rightly points out.  

All this he weighs against Rajapaksa, during the course of the election campaign saying that Tamil Eelam could bloom after the election if the people choose poorly. It was not only Rajapaksa who said it. Many of the key spokespersons for the SLPP issued that warning. 

Now appointing a committee to come up with solutions does not necessarily mean that one always knew about the outcome.  There was an issue with the composition of the Tissa Vitharana Committee. It was federalist-heavy. The outcome was unceremoniously dumped.   

That error was repeated in the Steering Committee. Voting for turning Parliament into a Constitutional Assembly does not mean that Rajapaksa or anyone else were voting for Sampanthan’s outcome preference. There were more than one report that came out of the deliberations of the Steering Committee. Nothing concrete has come out of it. 

The contradiction comes from the ‘thirteen plus’ statement and from the ‘maximum devolution’ pledge.  Only Rajapaksa would know why he made such careless statements.  He did make them, and that’s what counts.  And that’s why Sampanthan is absolutely right in chastising Rajapaksa for what is clearly double-speak and therefore irresponsible. [Read also 'The pluses and minuses of the 13th Amendment']

Whether such irresponsibility on the part of ‘The lotus bud’ as Sampanthan puts it results in Eelam blooming is a different matter, however.  The notion is interesting. What it implies is that there is an Eelam bud already which is not a product of the lotus bud.  

What is this Eelam bud? Well, Sampanthan describes it unwittingly. Listen to him:

‘I want to put on record  that my Party at this Election, in our manifesto, talked of a political solution within the framework of an undivided, indivisible, single country. There was no campaign carried on, anyway, in the North and East which talked of division of the country. We only talked of a solution that is acceptable to our people, that is reasonable substantial power-sharing within the framework of a united, undivided, indivisible single country.’

The bud’s right there.  The Eelam bud that is.  What is power-sharing if not Federalism? What is Power-sharing without talking of history, demography and geography if not devious machinations for land theft based on a myth-model? What is ‘substantial’ in this context if it is not a legitimation of a lie in its extrapolation? Rajapaksa, like others, have purchased the lie of Eelamists by indulging in vague-speak on devolution.  He has bought into the Eelamist bud, knowingly or unknowingly, or else used the term carelessly and irresponsibly for petty political purposes.  Sampanthan is however the real deal. He’s not playing politics-of-the-moment. He is not indulging in conveniences. He is speaking the truth of the Eelam bud.

Both men are talking ‘substantial devolution’ or ‘maximum devolution’ in a context where Eelamists have superimposed the concocted territory of ‘historical (sic) homelands’ on lines drawn arbitrarily on by the British. Such words are tossed around in a context of a constructed history, a refusal to peruse archaeological evidence to back claims, and  absolute silence on demographic and geographical realities (almost half the Tamils live outside the so-called ‘historical homelands’ while even the Eelam map shrinks when we factor in territories where communities have actually lived in for long periods of time, especially in the Eastern Province). 

Against this background and the considerable Eelamists posturing by Tamil Nationalists, Samoanthan included, talking of Lotus buds blooming Eelam flowers is laughable. It makes one conclude that tossing out words such as ‘indivisible,’ ‘undivided’ and ‘single country’ is nothing but eyewash. That;s just frill in whose shade the Eelam bud can be nurtured into full bloom, remembering of course Chelvanayakam’s famous strategic plan for Eelam, ‘A little now, more later’.   

Let’s get this straight.  Sampanthan and the Eelamists, now in defence mode and in reduced circumstances following the military rout of the LTTE, are indulging in federalist talk.  Federalism is about territories with distinct peoples voluntarily coming together. It naturally implies that having come together, any of the entities thus ‘united’ (another problematic words used by Sampanthan and his ilk) can voluntarily choose to go it alone.  This is bud. This is the rub.

This is the bud that the federalists in the business of constitutional reform are carefully and surreptitiously watering and fertilizing.  Rajapaksa, because of his careless of ill-advised uttering, has no moral authority to cry foul over Eelam-budding, but that does not mean people need not be concerned about it.  After all, when G.G. Ponnambalam was spouting communalism, few would have thought that the 50-50 bud would bloom into a rabid terrorist outfit like the LTTE which would reduced people like Sampanthan into choirboys and cheerleaders. 

The Rajapaksa camp, then, does not have the moral right to raise fears over an Eelam-bud, but it does not follow that the fears expressed are without basis. He cannot talk, but others can and must. They must because Sampanthan has clearly reiterated that there is an Eelam bud and because the entire constitutional reform project is run by lackeys of the bud-blooming project. Most importantly, they have demonstrated their utter lack of integrity in ‘process’ by refusing to enumerate grievances and by refusing to consider undeniable historical, demographic and geographical factors.  It has been reduced to a process of predetermining telos and constructing conditions and modeling myths to obtain that end point. 

As long as the Eelam-bud exists, then it will be named as such, Sampanthan should understand this. Just because someone doesn’t have a moral right to call it such does not mean it does not exist.  Sure, various people can nurture it, but the principal gardener is the federalist. Sampanthan, if you want to put a name to it.

READ ALSO:

Devolution talk and devolution-talkers

Words, deeds and devolution-fixations

The LLRC and devolution: the politics of skipping the caveats

Power-sharing, yes; devolution, no

Devolution-justification: how about some truth, justification and reconciliation?

Malinda Seneviratne is a freelance writer. www.malindawords.blogspot.com.

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Dissolve or be dissolved

Constitutions are not always made with good intention. Even when the intention is good the unexpected trumps the word. They are supposed to be documents of the ‘forever’ kind, but if one thing is certain it is the fact that the sum total of human knowledge is but a speck of dust compared to the universe of human ignorance. And so we have amendments, some pushed through to further narrow political and personal objectives and some to correct flaws showed up by unexpected developments.  

Those who authored the 19th Amendment were quite rightly seeking to reverse the anti-democratic 18th Amendment. They reintroduced term-limits, which was good. They restored and added to the 17th Amendment, i.e. the establishment of the Constitutional Council and independent commissions. 

They erred/subtracted when they wrote in the composition of the Constitutional Council.  They were narrow and self-seeking when they used the notion of a ‘National Government’  to get around the election promise of downsizing the cabinet.  And they didn’t anticipate the February 10th result, just as J.R. Jayewardene didn’t anticipate Sarath N Silva’s determination to enable crossovers or the sway that someone like Mahinda Rajapaksa could have in obtaining a two-thirds majority regardless of the outcome of a parliamentary election.

So what have we got now? In a word, confusion. We have a parliamentary composition that is at odds with the sentiments of the people. Throw in what was always an iffy union between two parties that are so alike but have been at each other’s throats for more than half a century and a pact that started coming apart even before the local government election, and it’s a bloody mess.

The unity-pact, so-called, expired on the 31st of December 2017. As such there is no formal agreement that gives credence to the notion of a ‘national government’ which, by the way, has been ill-defined in the 19th Amendment.  One might argue that the Cabinet has lost legitimacy.  

It is against all this that the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) mull their respective political futures. The UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe claims that he has constitutional legitimacy. He has avoided speaking about the cabinet and in particular its size. Given the now openly admitted rift, his task would be to secure support from SLFPers not inclined to go along in a possible but uneasy and even dangerous alliance with the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP). He can probably count on the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) not to side with his political opponents should there be a vote in Parliament.  

The leader of the SLFP, President Sirisena, indicating that he’s broken off the engagement with Wickremesinghe, has deployed loyalists to woo UNPers disenchanted with Wickremesinghe. Naturally, Sirisena has the harder task. Around 25 MPs would have to defect, provided of course that only around 7 or 8 would go over to the UNP and that the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) will back him.

His party ended a distant third behind the UNP and the SLPP. His political fortunes are on the wane, to put it politely.  To the extent that the local government election was also a contest about who owns the SLFP (it’s parliamentary group, members and supporters), it is clear that Mahinda Rajapaksa is the clear winner. The 1.5 million votes that the SLFP/UPFA received (just over 13% of the total votes cast) are more likely to gravitate to the SLPP rather than the UNP. 

Sirisena, then, is not in a position to demand. He could, however, keep things in limbo, hoping that it would feed discontent within the UNP, leading to Wickremesinghe being ousted. A long shot, though.

The SLPP is in a very strong position, in contrast. It is reported that the party’s de-facto leader, Mahinda Rajapaksa, who is also a ‘Senior Advisor’ of the SLFP, has indicated that the SLPP would support the SLFP if it manages to cobble together a working majority. The SLPP, it is reported, will not seek cabinet portfolios in such an eventuality. In effect the SLPP would hold the SLFP/UPFA as well as President Sirisena hostage, politically. In any case, the SLPP can step back and enjoy the bitter fight between the SLFP and the UNP for control of the government and indeed for political relevance at least in the short term.  

Whoever ends up in control will have to reduce the size of the cabinet to 30. Therefore loyalty would have to be purchased through means other than offering a portfolio. Few if any are in this for ideological reasons. Politically, there’s nothing attractive that either party can offer anyone from the other side. Since there is no provision for the dissolution of Parliament apart from the death, resignation and the rejection by Parliament of the government’s policy statement or budget, things may very well trudge along in this muddled manner until March 2019.  

While some UNPers have claimed that the election loss was because the party wasn’t allowed to implement its policies, rank incompetence and a blind-eye or complicity in monumental corruption cannot be ruled out as factors. Going solo is unlikely to change public perception regarding the party, especially since an embittered President can and probably will move on prosecuting those responsible for the Central Bank bond issue scam. An SLFP/UPFA government would find it even tougher given terribly reduced circumstances.

All things considered a dissolution of Parliament would be best at this point. Theoretically it is possible to obtain the two-thirds majority required to pass through enabling legislation. The immediate beneficiary would of course be the SLPP since it owns the political momentum following the unexpected and unprecedented victory at the local government elections. This could dissuade both the SLFP and UNP from considering such a course of action. 

The alternatives, however, could be worse. The more muddled and confused things are, and that’s what is reasonable to expect considering the track-record of the ‘Yahapalana’ government and the peculiar circumstances it finds itself in, the longer dissolution takes the worse would be the result. Rajapaksa and the SLPP can afford to wait, for they alone can continue to work at the grassroots mobilizing support for the cause of getting rid of a UNP-SLFP regime that doesn’t seem to know if it’s coming or going.  

Those who are blind to the recent and all-time track-records of the UNP and what’s left of the SLFP might shudder at the thought of Rajapaksa returning to power. The truth is there is little to choose between the UNP, SLFP and SLPP when it comes to corruption, power-abuse, thuggery and murder, unless of course one deliberately blocks out massive chunks of post-independence history.  

The argument for constitutional amendment (of the 19th) to enable dissolution stands not on such things but the simple fact of legitimate representation or rather the lack thereof. This Parliament, as the results of the local government election demonstrates beyond a shadow of doubt, is illegitimate. It does not reflect the popular sentiments of the people.  Its continuation amounts to a travesty of justice and a deference to everything that rebels against the spirit of democracy.  

The silence of the so-called progressives in certain NGO circles, ‘informed academics,’ political commentators and other activists on all this is deafening. 

Dissolution. That’s what needs to be agitated for. If nothing else, it would involve correcting a constitutional error in the 19th Amendment.  

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Mandate lost: no two words about it

Mahinda Rajapaksa, after losing the Presidential Election, making his now infamous from-the-window speech, blamed it ‘on the Tamils’.  It was a crass, knee-jerk conclusion which was racist and a complete disavowal of his own and significant flaws.  He has since sobered up.  

Maybe the United National Party (UNP) will also sober up soon.  It’s to their advantage to do so.  Right now, it is apparent that the UNP is punch-drunk and even more incoherent than usual. ‘Even more’ because lack of clarity on multiple issues has been the hallmark of the UNP-led regime.  

While some dismayed UNPers have called for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s blood, others have looked elsewhere to find reasons for the defeat.  For example, Wickremesinghe’s closest political associates have pointed the finger at President Maithripala Sirisena. The UNP couldn’t really implement its economic policy, they argue.  

So one might say that there is some self-reflection happening.  What is strange however is that some stalwarts are blaming the defeat on the Government not putting Mahinda Rajapaksa, his brothers, sons and close friends behind bars.  This means that either people didn’t want the Rajapaksas incarcerated or that was a non-issue for them or else they rewarded the Rajapaksas because, damn it, the UNP-SLFP yahapalana regime didn’t put them behind bars!  

It’s as if a trail of broken campaign promises didn’t count.  ECTA didn’t matter, neither did the sale of Hambantota. Constitutional jugglery starting from the flawed 19th Amendment which allowed for a bloated cabinet didn’t count.  Attempts to smuggle in a federal constitution was a non-factor. Nepotism starting with the President with the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers was forgotten.  And no, the Central Bank bond scam just did not happen!  This is what these people want us to believe.  The truth is that the professionals and academics as well as staunch believers in the good-governance pledge got disillusioned with the regime pretty fast.  

Still, Mangala Samaraweera and others will not believe it. Indeed, they believe the UNP won!  According to Mangala, 6.1 million people (55.3%) had ‘marched to the polls and voted against a return to the Rajapaksa rule'. He says that whereas Mahinda Rajapaksa commanded 5.77 million votes in January 2015, he couldn’t even muster 4.95 million votes this time.

The numbers are correct. The interpretation silly. Sorry, stupid. Reminds one of that old line about falsehoods and forces me to add to it thus: ‘there are lies, damned lies, statistics and Mangala Samaraweera’.  

Let’s apply Mangala’s logic to his party and that of the President.  We could conclude that roughly 7.4 million and a whopping 9.5 million marched to the polls to vote against the UNP and SLFP/UPFA respectively. How Mangala interprets the following facts only he would know, but these are numbers that ought to rouse the UNP from its deep stupor. 

The UNP vote declined from 5.1 million in August 2015 to just 3.6 million on February 10, 2018 which is a loss of around 1.5 million votes.  The UNP’s vote share fell from 45.7% in August 2015 to 32.63% or more than 13 percentage points.  So, following Mangala, we can say that 77.37% have rejected the UNP and 86.62% have rejected Maithripala Sirisena and the SLFP/UPFA.  Happy?

If you take out the areas where the vast majority of voters are Tamils, the numbers should terrify the UNP.  The UNP lost the following districts which the party had secured in August 2015: Colombo, Gampaha, Kandy, Matale, Trincomalee, Puttalam, Polonnaruwa and Kegalle. The party retained Nuwara Eliya (down fro 59.1% to 37.3%), Digamadulla (down from 46% to 26%) and Badulla (down from 54.8% to 32%).  Where the UNP lost, it lost badly, securing around 25% of the vote. The ‘national’ figures are obviously boosted by the returns from strongholds where too there’s a decline in popularity indicated.  

The coalition that defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015 is no longer together. If they were, then one could not only add what each got but it is likely that they would have polled more than they actually did. T

his is undeniable: the UNP, SLFP and JVP contested SEPARATELY.  It is ridiculous to operate as though 2018 is 2015 and that the parties are united.  They are not. 

If this election was, among other things, a battle for the ownership of the SLFP then the party has gone to Mahinda Rajapaksa, one can conclude.  Using Mangala-logic, it can be argued that in subsequent elections the majority of those who voted for the SLFP/UPFA is more likely to go with the ‘pohottuwa’ than the ‘aliya’ not least of all because the UNP has all but ended the marriage with the President’s party.  Even if one were to split the SLFP/UPFA vote equally between the UNP and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the latter would gather close to 50% in some districts and well over 50% in most.  

If the numbers are used to apportion district gains assuming it was a General Election, then with the bonus seats coming into play the SLPP would have secured a majority of parliamentary seats.  If the system used at the February 10 election was employed, the vast majority of electorates would have been won by the SLPP.  Perhaps using such frames Mangala could calculate who marched for what and where they ended up.  Perhaps following the dictum ‘it’s good to hope for the best but expect the worst,’ Mangala could extrapolate this result onto the outcome of a general election where the SLFP/UPFA voters would vote for the SLPP en masse.  That would sober everyone up.  

As things stand, only those in the UNP who are in denial would find consolation in Mangala’s thesis on the local government election.  

I have no issue with delusion if it helps alleviate pain. What’s not pardonable is the distraction and deliberate fudging of political reality. 

The UNP-SLFP regime has been proven to be incompetent and found to be corrupt.  It was a vote of no-confidence on the regime; going even by Mangala’s Arithmetic more than half the total number that voted rejected the UNP-SLFP Unity Government.  The numbers in Parliament no longer reflect the sentiments of the electorate.  It is a travesty of justice to operate as though the people do not count. It is immoral to take refuge in the 19th Amendment’s provision for Parliament not to be dissolved before March 2020.  The numbers can be found to introduce a special clause to facilitate dissolution.   

The mandate has been lost and although Mangala and others feign to be at a loss to comprehend what has happened the fact has not been lost on the people.  No mandate. No legitimacy.  It is time to figure out a civilized exit strategy.  

Malinda Seneviratne is a freelance writer. malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com

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