Showing posts with label Pohottuwa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pohottuwa. Show all posts

25 June 2022

The international community, the opposition and the people

 


Gotabaya Rajapaksa is the worst President we’ve had. He’s the worst leader, counting all presidents, prime ministers, ministers, chairpersons of local government authorities and maranaadhara samithi. He’s the worst Sri Lankan ever. Let’s assume.

Let’s assume that as the all-powerful Executive President, all ills are attributable to him. Let’s assume that although this implies that he can lay claim to all positives, he had nothing to do with effectively handling the Covid-19 situation, the vaccination drive and enforcement of safety protocols which (by the way) eventually enabled and empowered those who hate him the most (and whose hatred is rooted in political preferences and other things that predates the current economic crises) to rub shoulders with fellow political travelers in demonstrations, protest marches, arson, theft and thuggery. Let’s assume that he did nothing at all.

No, let’s go further. Let’s assume that Covid-19 was an insidious creation of Gotabaya Rajapaksa himself, a virus which he unleashed on the world with the express intent of wrecking the tourism sector, effecting a serious dent in remittances by expatriate workers, restricting movement etc., etc. Let’s assume that all this in aggregate made himself eminently eligible to the tag ‘party-pooper.’

Today, we are in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis. Today, more than ever before, we have been forced to think about things like energy security, food security, food and nutritional sovereignty, the need for development banks and the folly of embracing uncritically and indeed nurturing to near perfection an import mafia. Let’s assume, though, that Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s rhetoric and action with regard to at least two of the above, namely renewable energy and environment-friendly agriculture, had nothing to do with such ‘needs.’

Let us not assume but acknowledge that regardless of intent, overall understanding and objectives pertaining to sovereignty that Gotabaya Rajapaksa was largely unsuccessful. Let’s assume that this had nothing to do with the resilience of entrenched interests of corporate thugs and public racketeers, but let’s not assume but rather acknowledge that party and family played a massive role in scuttling good intention, not just about energy and agriculture but basic management of the economy, upholding procedures established to ensure fiscal discipline, robust and meaningful tax regimes etc. Let’s not assume but acknowledge that Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s greatest failure was that he could not (or would not) unfetter himself from party and family.

Forget all that. Let’s return to the first assumption. Let us repeat. Gotabaya Rajapaksa is the worst President we’ve had. He’s the worst leader, counting all presidents, prime ministers, ministers, chairpersons of local government authorities and maranaadhara samithi. He’s the worst Sri Lankan ever. Let’s assume.

We should mention, at least parenthetically, that he is but (and at worst) a symptom of systemic flaw. At least that’s what those who can see beyond personality and party could (but probably for reasons of political convenience do not) conclude. Never mind. Let’s assume ‘Gota is the System’ and kid ourselves that getting rid of him gives us system-change. Well, let’s say it paves the way for system-change. Yes, let’s not talk about utter naĂŻvetĂ© in these matters. Let’s assume. Let’s conclude.

Now, treating all assumptions as established fact, let us wave the flag of the logical response: ‘Gota should go!’ How do we move from there, i.e. beyond a slogan whose utterers aren’t political innocents and among whom are those who have benefited for decades (as a class and as individuals) or else are ill-educated about constitutions, constitutional reform and the whole brouhaha over amendments (the draft 21st was shot down by the Supreme Court, whose observations amount to law-makers being given a resounding F on the subject of ‘Constitutionality’)?

Of course Gotabaya Rajapaksa can resign. Can happen, but hasn’t. He can be removed, constitutionally. Can happen, but hasn’t. And so we have pundits saying ‘the people, the international community and the Opposition’ have to come together to remove him. In essence, to secure the numbers necessary to remove him constitutionally. He can be ousted in other ways, but no one is seriously talking about ‘revolution’ here. Revolution would include system-change and ‘system’ would include the economic theories (sic) that went a long way to bring us to where we are, dealings with the IMF and other Bretton Woods Institutions etc., but no one is seriously considering such options right now. It’s just ‘Gota must go,’ or ‘The international community, the Opposition and the people must get together  and send Gota away.’  Thereafter, parliament (or rather ‘The Opposition’) can figure out who should be the next president. Lovely.

Let’s get back to the movers and shakers. The international Community, one. Yeah right! Do they mean, the US, UK, EU and other members of The Quad? Now if those are the addresses to which grievance are addressed and succour sought, good luck!

The Opposition, two. Yeah right! And yeah, those who want Gota sent away utter not a word about capabilities of the current Opposition (never mind legitimacy which is ultimately measurable only through the ballot). The Opposition, if we just take the SJB and the JVP, essentially back-stabbed the ‘Aragalaya’ and ‘Aragalists,’ not to mention the fact that they deliberately planned to pursue their party interests by preying on general anxiety, fear and anger. Sajith Premadasa and Anura Kumara Dissanayake hilariously claimed that they would take up the prime minister’s post if Gotabaya Rajapaksa resigned. Each ought to have been more honest and said ‘I become PM if Gota resigns, and then I have the inside track to the Presidency.’ Anyone who places bets on such dishonest people and parties (whose track records are as bad or worse than those of the SLPP) are ridiculously naive or at least politically suspect. The SLFP, then? Really?  

‘The people,’ three. Now that’s a different category altogether. We cannot and should not say ‘yeah, right!’ or be dismissive in some other way. Democracy is about the people. How do we measure the weight of the people factor, though? The numbers at protests, the decibel levels of the rhetoric? Yes, in a way, never mind that among these ‘people’ are agents provocateurs and others whose political history doesn’t make one really cheer, especially given long and profound silence about what ‘the system’ has done and to whom for decades.

In a way, yes, ‘The people’ count.  They need to be counted. Literally.  My friend Sugath Kulatunga, commenting on dubious individuals including ‘intellectuals,’ professionals, the clergy and artists marking ‘presence’ at Galle Face, made a pertinent observation.

‘I believe [they] have had no lessons in Civics at school and are not aware that Sri Lanka is a democracy with a written constitution where tenets of majority rule and rule of law are enshrined.’

If you want to step out of all that, by all means. Just don’t dabble in constitutions and parliamentary affairs. A precedent set where a bunch of people even with legitimate reasons to protest (and the legitimacy of the protests are indisputable, let us not forget) browbeat the elected and obtain eviction without measuring the true nature of a) popular discontent, and b) agreement about the would-be successor’s ability to turn things around does not bode well for participatory democracy.

The silliness of all this talk about the Gota-Ranil combine being a failure is easily measured by a simple question: name another combine that can deliver. The truth is, politicians and parties as they stand today, given histories and fixations about economics, cannot deliver us from the evils they’ve showered us with. We might have to look elsewhere, but certainly not at the international community, the Opposition or ‘people’ who are deliberately left undefined.

Anarchy, then, by all means, but then call it that. Just don’t sugar-coat it with democracy-speak.


[Malinda Seneviratne is the Director/CEO of the Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute. These are his personal views.'


05 September 2019

‘Elpitiya’ as beginning and end




Elections to every single local government authority in the Galle District were held on February 10, 2018. Except Elpitiya. That was due to a petition by the United National Party (UNP) pleading relief over perceived error in their nomination list being rejected. Time passed. We had the parliamentary crisis at the end of that year. We had the Easter Sunday attacks a few months ago. Even people who were aware of that election or rather non-election forgot about Elpitiya. 

Not any longer. With the court directing the Elections Commission to hold elections for the Elpitiya Pradeshiya Sabhava immediately, we are seeing a rehearsal, a by-election of sorts and a referendum all rolled into one.  

Here’s what happened. The yahapalanaya regime went into strange contortions to postpone local government elections. Well, provincial councils too, but that’s another story. By the time elections were called, the yahapalana coalition had cracked. Corruption, nepotism and incompetence had become too apparent to hide. The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) was the clear victor. President Sirisena’s true strength was revealed (the Sri Lanka Freedom Party [SLFP] got less than 15% of the vote and the UNP’s vote bank had dwindled to around 30%. 

The outlook for the yahapalana group is bleak. The SLFP or rather Maithripala Sirisena would be forced to take a stand, i.e. whether to enter into a coalition with the SLPP, tag itself to the UNP (or a faction of that party led by Sajith Premadasa, if the internal crisis is not resolved) or go it alone. Unenviable. The JVP was not officially a member of the yahapalana coalition, but stood with Sirisena and later the UNP against Mahinda Rajapaksa and later the SLFP-SLPP ‘arrangement’ during the parliamentary crisis a year ago. The JVP has decided to do their own thing this time around. The risk is their strength being revealed, but it’s a risk they’ve embraced, for better or worse.  

The UNP has spared no pains to paint President Sirisena as the villain of the piece called ‘Yahapalanaya.’ The UNP is still ‘government’. It is not opposition. It had mandate and responsibility. The UNP failed to deliver on all counts. The UNP is directly implicated in nepotism and corruption. The UNP marked itself as ‘incompetent.’ Ranil Wickremesinghe is the leader of this incompetent and corrupt UNP and Sajith Premadasa his lieutenant — no one can claim ‘I was a peon’ in the yahapalana regime.   

All these parties fared abysmally in February 2018. The SLPP secured 50.57% of the total vote in the Galle District, the UNP got 26.65%, the UPFA got 11.65% and the JVP 6.27%. 

The numbers may have changed. For the worse. Impatience with the regime may have enhanced rather than declined disenchantment for reasons of incompetence, incoherence and of course the scandalous failures on the security/intelligence front that led to the Easter Sunday attacks. There’s a strong likelihood that most of the 75,827 votes the UPFA received would slide towards the SLPP if the SLFP decides not to contest or have a pact with the UPFA. Even if the SLFP contests on its own, it is highly unlikely that it will retain the 11.65% share of February 2018. That could be halved or worse with ‘defection’ to the SLPP. 

And so we have ‘Elpitiya’. Is Elpitiya a microcosm of Sri Lanka? No. The Tamil and Muslim communities are negligible in Elpitiya. They won’t be in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in certain other parts of the country.  A UNP presidential candidate might be routed in Elpitiya (or in the Southern Province as a whole) but might win in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, although with a smaller margin than in 2015. 

Elpitiya is rural. Whereas the SLPP handsomely won all the pradesheeya sabhas in the Galle District, the UNP secured the Galle Municipal Council. In fact the UNP did better in the urban and municipal council elections than in the pradesheeya sabha elections in all parts of the country. 

This dissimilarity between the perceived urban and perceived rural gets smudged in important elections. For example, the tendency across the board was against the UNP in 1994 and clearly against Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015. In 2019, we might once again see a ‘unity’ of sorts between the urban and rural in terms of a common need to show the yahapalanists the political door.  

Regardless of these realities, the result will most certainly reflect voter sentiment. It will be read by the victor as a reflection of national sentiments, especially if the SLPP wins as expected. The losers would be forced to come up with elaborate statistical analyses to demonstrate that things could be different in a presidential race. Nevertheless, a rout in Elpitiya would severely demoralize, say, the UNP loyalist in Elpitiya-like electorates throughout the country and even in less Elpitiya-like places. The ‘urban’ areas, for example. It would cost the UNP candidate, whoever it may be.  Elpitiya, in short, would not only be read as ‘reflection’ of general sentiment, but would be a momentum giver and wrecker, to winner and loser(s) respectively. 

The SLPP is ready, obviously. The JVP always has its ‘people’ on the ground. The loyalists will vote as they always do, never mind that they have struggled to win over people outside the party. The SLFP’s identity crisis (migrate to the SLPP, play bystander, contest?) will be resolved, one way or the other, but the outcome is unlikely to propel the party into believing that fielding its own candidate makes any sense. The UNP will have to contest.

The UNP will have to decide on who will lead the party’s efforts in Elpitiya. Will Sajith be asked to ‘put out or shut up’? Will the party have resolved the candidate-issue by then? It is not an election that the UNP wants to contest, but it is an election the party cannot avoid. If the UNP loses by a small margin there will be positives to carry to the presidential election. Ranil (or Sajith or both) could spur the loyalists to work harder. If they lose by a margin similar to that of February 2018 and the party can obtain the consolation argument, ‘we have not lost ground.’ However, if the margin of defeat is greater than those related to the other pradesheeya sabha elections in the Galle District, the UNP will have to stomach ‘done and dusted’.  

Obviously, the SLPP cannot sit on February 2018 laurels either. If there’s gain, that locks up the presidential prize and if there’s the slightest decline, then it means the fat lady is yet to sing.  

Either way, Elpitiya could very well be the place where the presidential election begins and ends. For all these parties. 

malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com   

15 February 2018

Mandate lost: no two words about it



Mahinda Rajapaksa, after losing the Presidential Election, making his now infamous from-the-window speech, blamed it ‘on the Tamils’.  It was a crass, knee-jerk conclusion which was racist and a complete disavowal of his own and significant flaws.  He has since sobered up.  

Maybe the United National Party (UNP) will also sober up soon.  It’s to their advantage to do so.  Right now, it is apparent that the UNP is punch-drunk and even more incoherent than usual. ‘Even more’ because lack of clarity on multiple issues has been the hallmark of the UNP-led regime.  

While some dismayed UNPers have called for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s blood, others have looked elsewhere to find reasons for the defeat.  For example, Wickremesinghe’s closest political associates have pointed the finger at President Maithripala Sirisena. The UNP couldn’t really implement its economic policy, they argue.  

So one might say that there is some self-reflection happening.  What is strange however is that some stalwarts are blaming the defeat on the Government not putting Mahinda Rajapaksa, his brothers, sons and close friends behind bars.  This means that either people didn’t want the Rajapaksas incarcerated or that was a non-issue for them or else they rewarded the Rajapaksas because, damn it, the UNP-SLFP yahapalana regime didn’t put them behind bars!  

It’s as if a trail of broken campaign promises didn’t count.  ECTA didn’t matter, neither did the sale of Hambantota. Constitutional jugglery starting from the flawed 19th Amendment which allowed for a bloated cabinet didn’t count.  Attempts to smuggle in a federal constitution was a non-factor. Nepotism starting with the President with the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers was forgotten.  And no, the Central Bank bond scam just did not happen!  This is what these people want us to believe.  The truth is that the professionals and academics as well as staunch believers in the good-governance pledge got disillusioned with the regime pretty fast.  

Still, Mangala Samaraweera and others will not believe it. Indeed, they believe the UNP won!  According to Mangala, 6.1 million people (55.3%) had ‘marched to the polls and voted against a return to the Rajapaksa rule'. He says that whereas Mahinda Rajapaksa commanded 5.77 million votes in January 2015, he couldn’t even muster 4.95 million votes this time.

The numbers are correct. The interpretation silly. Sorry, stupid. Reminds one of that old line about falsehoods and forces me to add to it thus: ‘there are lies, damned lies, statistics and Mangala Samaraweera’.  

Let’s apply Mangala’s logic to his party and that of the President.  We could conclude that roughly 7.4 million and a whopping 9.5 million marched to the polls to vote against the UNP and SLFP/UPFA respectively. How Mangala interprets the following facts only he would know, but these are numbers that ought to rouse the UNP from its deep stupor. 

The UNP vote declined from 5.1 million in August 2015 to just 3.6 million on February 10, 2018 which is a loss of around 1.5 million votes.  The UNP’s vote share fell from 45.7% in August 2015 to 32.63% or more than 13 percentage points.  So, following Mangala, we can say that 77.37% have rejected the UNP and 86.62% have rejected Maithripala Sirisena and the SLFP/UPFA.  Happy?

If you take out the areas where the vast majority of voters are Tamils, the numbers should terrify the UNP.  The UNP lost the following districts which the party had secured in August 2015: Colombo, Gampaha, Kandy, Matale, Trincomalee, Puttalam, Polonnaruwa and Kegalle. The party retained Nuwara Eliya (down fro 59.1% to 37.3%), Digamadulla (down from 46% to 26%) and Badulla (down from 54.8% to 32%).  Where the UNP lost, it lost badly, securing around 25% of the vote. The ‘national’ figures are obviously boosted by the returns from strongholds where too there’s a decline in popularity indicated.  

The coalition that defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015 is no longer together. If they were, then one could not only add what each got but it is likely that they would have polled more than they actually did. T

his is undeniable: the UNP, SLFP and JVP contested SEPARATELY.  It is ridiculous to operate as though 2018 is 2015 and that the parties are united.  They are not. 

If this election was, among other things, a battle for the ownership of the SLFP then the party has gone to Mahinda Rajapaksa, one can conclude.  Using Mangala-logic, it can be argued that in subsequent elections the majority of those who voted for the SLFP/UPFA is more likely to go with the ‘pohottuwa’ than the ‘aliya’ not least of all because the UNP has all but ended the marriage with the President’s party.  Even if one were to split the SLFP/UPFA vote equally between the UNP and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the latter would gather close to 50% in some districts and well over 50% in most.  

If the numbers are used to apportion district gains assuming it was a General Election, then with the bonus seats coming into play the SLPP would have secured a majority of parliamentary seats.  If the system used at the February 10 election was employed, the vast majority of electorates would have been won by the SLPP.  Perhaps using such frames Mangala could calculate who marched for what and where they ended up.  Perhaps following the dictum ‘it’s good to hope for the best but expect the worst,’ Mangala could extrapolate this result onto the outcome of a general election where the SLFP/UPFA voters would vote for the SLPP en masse.  That would sober everyone up.  

As things stand, only those in the UNP who are in denial would find consolation in Mangala’s thesis on the local government election.  

I have no issue with delusion if it helps alleviate pain. What’s not pardonable is the distraction and deliberate fudging of political reality. 

The UNP-SLFP regime has been proven to be incompetent and found to be corrupt.  It was a vote of no-confidence on the regime; going even by Mangala’s Arithmetic more than half the total number that voted rejected the UNP-SLFP Unity Government.  The numbers in Parliament no longer reflect the sentiments of the electorate.  It is a travesty of justice to operate as though the people do not count. It is immoral to take refuge in the 19th Amendment’s provision for Parliament not to be dissolved before March 2020.  The numbers can be found to introduce a special clause to facilitate dissolution.   

The mandate has been lost and although Mangala and others feign to be at a loss to comprehend what has happened the fact has not been lost on the people.  No mandate. No legitimacy.  It is time to figure out a civilized exit strategy.  


Malinda Seneviratne is a freelance writer. malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com