මසක කාලයක් ගෝල් ෆේස් හි ගොඩනැගු ගෝටාගෝගමෙහි දහස් ගණන් තරුණ තරුණියන් මෙන් ම නොයෙකුත් මතවාදී ධාරාවන් නියෝජනය කරන අන් අය එකට බැඳ තැබූ සුන්දර වරපටය ආදරයයි. එකට එක් වී වැපුරුවේ ආදරයයි. යෙදුනේ හෙට දින රට හදන ව්යායාමයක පෙරහුරුවකයි. අහිංසකත්වය, අවිහිංසාවාදය, නිර්මාණශීලිත්වය, එඩිතරකම, ඉවසීම, සාමුහිකත්වය යනාදියෙන් අරගල භූමිය සුවඳවත් විය. එවැනි අහිංසක, අවිහිංසාවාදී, නිර්මාණශීලී, එඩිතර අරගලයක් මතක ඉතිහාසයේ නැති තරම්ය. අපේ රටේ හෙට දවස පිලිබඳව සුභවාදීව හිතන්න අරගලකරුවන් සියලු දෙනාට බල කර සිටියා මෙන් ය.
ඊයේ මැර ප්රහාර එල්ල කරන ලද්දේ අරගලකරුවන්ට පමණක් නොව, ඒ සුභවාදී සිහිනයට මෙන් ම මේ ගොඩනැගෙමින් තිබුණු අපුර්වත්වය දෙස ආදරයෙන් බලා සිටි සුවහසක් හදවත් වෙතය. මැර කණ්ඩායම් මෙහෙය වූ අය තක්සේරු නොකෙරුවේ මෙයයි. ගෝටාගෝගම යනු රට පුරා විහිද ගිය ආණ්ඩු විරෝධයක එක් ප්රකාශයක් බව ඔවුන් නොසිතුවා විය හැක. මැර ප්රහාරවලින් සිහින තුවාල වන්නේ නැති බව ඔවුන් දැන සිටියේ නැත. කෙතරම් දරුණු ලෙස පහර දුන්නත්, අරගලකරුවන්ගේ අධිෂ්ඨානය පලුදු කළ නොහැකි තරමටම ඝනකම්ව අරගලකරුවන්ගේ ආදරය වර්ධනය වී තිබිණ. සිහිනයේ බ්ලු ප්රින්ට් එක ඉතා වේගයෙන් නැවත සකස්වුනි.
වෛරයම වපුරා, ප්රචණ්ඩත්වය යෝජනා කර, විහිංසනයේ මාවතම තෝරාගෙන ක්රියාත්මක වුවන්ට උපේක්ෂාව හෝ අනුකම්පාව නෙළා ගැනීමට අවසර නැත. ජනතා විරෝධය ජනතා කෝපය බවටත් කෝපය ප්රකෝපය දක්වා වර්ධනය විය. සංවිධානාත්මක පිරිස් ප්රභූ නිවෙස් ගිනිබත් කිරීමට කටයුතු කළා යැයි විවිධ මත ඉදිරිපත් කරන කිසිවෙකුට බැහැර කළ නොහැකි කාරණය වන්නේ ඒ සියල්ල සඳහා මාර්ග බාධක ඉවත් කරන ලද්දේ මැරයන් ම සහ ඔවුන් මෙහෙයවූවන් බවයි. අද වන විට මහින්දගේ සහ ඔහුගේ දේශපාලන සගයින්ගේ ලේ ඉල්ලන තැනට සියල්ල තල්ලු කලේ ඔවුන් ම මෙහෙයවූ ලේ පිපාසිත මැරයින්ගේ ක්රියාකාරිත්වයයි.
ලේ පිපාසය පෙරළා ලේ පිපාසයම අවදි කරන බව ඉතිහාසය කියා දෙන සරලම පාඩමකි. සොඳුරු සිහින බොඳ වෙන්නේ එහෙමයි. 'ලෙයට ලෙය' දරුණුයි, එක්තරා ආකාරයකට මුග්දයි. පහරදීමට එරෙහිව පහරදීම එකක්, පහර දුන්න අයට පහර දීමත් 'පහර දීපිය' යන විධානය දුන් අයට පහර දීමත් තේරුම් ගත හැක, එහෙත් 'සතුරා' සොයා ගැනීමට අපහසු වූ විට සතුරා සංකේතවත් කරන සියලු දේ සහ සතුරාට නෑකම් කියන සියලු දෙනා විනාශ කිරීමට යොමු වීම 'සටන' භයානක පැත්තකට තල්ලු කිරීමක් වේ. එය දැනට උද්ගත වී ඇති තත්ත්වය තුල මීට වඩා බොහෝ දරුණු මිලිටරිකරණයකට අත වැනීමක් වැනිය. විශේෂයෙන්ම මතක තියාගතයුතු වන්නේ එවැනි 'තත්ත්වයක්' කෘත්රිමව නිර්මාණය කිරීමට වැඩිම හැකියාව ඇත්තේද ගැටුම ලේ ගැලුමකට පරිවර්තනය කිරීමට අවශ්ය පාර්ශවයන්ට බවයි. ඒ සඳහා හැම විට ම විභවය සතු වන්නේ මර්ධනකාරී රාජ්ය ව්යුහය හසුරවන්නන්ට වේ.
අරගලයට ඇති ප්රධාන ප්රාග්ධනය සදාචාරයේ වාසියයි. ප්රධාන අවිය ආදරයයි. ප්රබලම ශක්තීන් නම් සාමුහිකත්වයයි, අධිෂ්ටානයයි, සිහින දැකීමට ඇති හදවත් සහ සිහින සැබෑ කිරීමට අවශ්ය ආත්ම විශ්වාසයන් වේ. ඇමති මණ්ඩලය නොව ඇමති මණ්ඩල දෙකක් ඉවත් කරන්නත්, අගමැතිවරයෙක් ඉල්ලා අස්කරවන්නත් එය ප්රමාණවත් විය. රටක් ජනතාවක් අවදි කරන්නත්, අරගලයට කැඳවන්නත් එය ප්රමාණවත් විය. මේ සියල්ල ක්ෂණයකින් ම්ලේච්ඡත්වයෙන් මකා දැමිය හැක. නැවත කියන්නෙමි 'ලෙයට ලෙය' දරුණුයි, මුග්ධයි, අරගලයේ සදාචාරාත්මක වාසිය පලුදු කරයි. 'ලෙයට ආලය' ලයාන්විතයි, මෘදුයි, අරගලයට පණ පොවයි. මැර ප්රහාරයෙන් අනතුරුව ගෝටාගෝගම පුරා නොකියවෙන එනමුත් සියල්ල වෙළාගෙන ඇත්තේ 'ලෙයට ආලය' විසිනි. අරගල භූමිය හරහා තවමත් හමා යන, අරගලකරුවන්ට ශක්තිය පොවන සුවඳ එයයි. ගෝටාගෝගම වඩාත් ලස්සනට ප්රතිනිර්මාණය වුයේ ඒ නිසා ය.
අරගලයක ආරම්භය කවියක් වැනිය. අරගලයක හුස්ම හිරවෙන්න පටන්ගන්නේ අරගලයෙන් ආදරය ඉවත් වූ විටයි. ආදරය 'ලේෆ්ට්' වුනොත්, සටන්පාඨ සමග බිඳුණු සිහින පමණක් ඉතිරි වේ. වෛරයට වඩා ආදරය ඝනකම් විය යුතුම වන්නේ මේ නිසයි.
Showing posts with label SLPP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SLPP. Show all posts
11 May 2022
25 July 2020
Whither Gota and the SLPP?
Even
the staunchest opponents of the Government would concede that the Sri
Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) is more than likely to secure a clear
majority at the parliamentary elections in August. A resounding victory
for Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the last presidential elections less than a
year ago, an Opposition in disarray and a general approval rating of the
president for the way in which the Covid19 issue is being handled
certainly weighs things in favor of the SLPP.
The SLPP is seeking a two-thirds majority. Such a majority, historically, has fed power-greed to the detriment of democracy and the interests of the citizen. Let’s not forget however that Ranasinghe Premadasa and the UNP didn’t have a two-thirds majority and yet was responsible for the bloodiest period in post-independence history.
‘Fear of a two-thirds’ is obviously not reason enough for a voter to shift allegiance. Simply, one does not endorse a party/candidate that one considers less competent or downright moronic just because one’s first choice might obtain more control in government.
The numbers thrown up on August 5, 2020 will tell many stories, the possibility of cobbling a two-thirds being just one. Power tussles, imagined or real, could be analyzed thereafter. What is more important at this point is policy.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa carried out what was probably the first ever carbon neutral election campaign. By the 12th of November 2019, 26,000 trees had been planted, 6,000 above the 20,000 required to achieve carbon neutrality, accounting for average mortality rates and unexpected destruction. The campaign team maintained at the point that each tree will have a geo-tag to facilitate monitoring and that allometric equations would be used to infer the carbon content stored in these trees by using data such as height and diameter of the plants. The campaign team has not uttered a word since. Maybe it’s all good, but we have no way of knowing. Nevertheless it gave the indication that Gotabaya would be a ‘green president,’ quite in line with the campaign promise of an environment-friendly presidency.
And yet we saw a relaxing of sand-mining regulations following a cabinet decision ‘to support the construction industry.’ Environmentalists warned that the move would see a spike in illegal sand mining as such activity is detected mostly during transportation. Cabinet spokesperson Ramesh Pathirana would later admit that the liberalization of permits to transport sand was being abused and that there was indeed a spike in complaints about illegal mining.
Environmentalists are also up in arms over the decision to revisit Circular 5/2001 related to ‘Other State Lands.’ The Land Commissioner General has stated that a committee has been appointed to segregate lands into protected areas and bare lands. This was in response to objections to the cabinet decision to revoke Circular 5/2001 which would have brought such forests directly under District and Divisional Secretaries whereas previously provisions for releasing areas ‘for development’ had to adhere to numerous environmental protocols. Environmentalists claim that even existing regulations are being flouted and fear that removal of the same would make it an open season for wanton abuse.
The SLPP Government’s pledge to combat the ‘rice mafia’ has also been tested. Dismantling cooperatives of small-time rice millers clearly made a mockery of wresting ‘the right to price’ from the big players. Are they that powerful? Is the government that weak? Is it an indication of true ‘constituency’?
The SLPP Government has, to its credit, put a lot of effort to review the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact. The Gunaruwan Committee has effectively called for dropping it. For reasons best known to the President, the report has been sent for cabinet perusal. The map of Sri Lanka in 2050 as envisioned by the MCC team-leader, Steve Dobrilovic, presented at Temple Trees in August 2018 included a nation dividing electrified railway line between Colombo and Trincomalee. Jenner Edelman, MCC Country Director sweet-talked about it all being a gift and declared that the railway line was ‘fake news.’ When confronted with the relevant slides, she is reported to have gone red in the face and mumbled ‘Steve made a mistake in giving out this map.’ The MCC stinks. Period. Why the SLPP refuses to dump it clearly raises concerns over the party’s ‘nation first’ rhetoric.
Then there’s the issue of the Eastern Terminal of the Colombo Port. Is this pay-back to India for compensating for possible ‘loss of immediate bucks’ that could come with the MCC (minus of course the nation’s sovereignty).
The SLPP Government is simply not coming clean about all this. The President portrays himself as a nationalist. The SLPP claims the same. You can’t be a nationalist and barter sovereignty. It’s best to tell the truth and be judged accordingly. Navel-gazing and thumb-twiddling will be read as capitulation, nothing less.
The President raised a lot of hopes immediately after his election by limiting cabinet size. No mention of sticking to this after a possible victory in August. Why not? Are there plans to ‘buy over’ opposition MPs by offering portfolios and using provisions surreptitiously included in the 19th by the UNP (and endorsed by the SLFP and the then Joint Opposition led by Mahinda Rajapaksa)? A committee was appointed to receive applications to high posts. This was to minimize political interference. Well, the committee no longer exists. Loyalty outweighed competence. Is that what a future SLPP Government will also do? If not, the SLPP must tell the voter what’s what as would a ‘kiyana de karana - karana de kiyana (do what was promised, tell what’s being done)’ government.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa is a doer. It seems clear that he wants to do things differently. Is the SLPP with Gotabaya Rajapaksa? Will he become a creature of the party? Will the SLPP elect those who are in line with the President’s thinking or are they ok with how things were done before? Was Gotabaya Rajapaksa sincere in his promises and was he biding his time until a parliamentary majority was obtained? Will an SLPP-dominated parliament strengthen him or will it render him ineffective? Time will tell.
An SLPP victory is all but assured. That however doesn’t mean everyone, electors included, feels comfortable about endorsement being treated as a blank check. If Gotabaya and/or the SLPP believe it is a mandate for ‘do as we please,’ they would be dead wrong.
ALSO READ: Whither Sajith Premadasa and the SJB
malindasenevi@gmail.com
19 December 2019
The new populism is to resist populism and populists
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A general election will be held soon. That much is certain. Indeed, if not for the term-related clause in the 19th Amendment Parliament would be dissolved by now. This Parliament feels old. Older than a little over four years. Those of the UNP (United National Party) and the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) in Parliament have in fact lost their mandate, the former twice over. As for the SLFP, it was trounced at that election and any claims to a legit mandate obtains only on account of having supported Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the last minute.
Although Parliament has not been dissolved, parties and politicians are clearly getting ready. Maithripala Sirisena, perhaps hopeful for post-presidential relevance and obviously aware of general public sentiment, has made pro-Gotabaya noises. He’s urging the SLFP to help the president get a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Well, the SLFP doesn’t have much of a choice right now. The pre-election pact with the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) is all that the SLFP has by way of a trump card. A low one at that.
The UNP has to adopt an optimistic tone and it has. However, even if the newly elected president were to make several massive blunders, it is unlikely that the UNP would retain its parliamentary strength. All the bonus seats won by that party would go to the SLPP (with or without the SLFP) and the margins of defeat in each district are unlikely to get narrowed. What Sajith Premadasa got from the North and East would probably be reclaimed as right by the TNA and other Tamil and Muslim parties in these districts.
The JVP? Well, the prospects are not all that rosy, let’s say.
One thing that indicates possible result is the clamor for nomination. It’s the party bosses of the SLPP who are being harangued these days. An SLPP ticket is almost like half the battle won.
It all adds up to one thing. The SLPP and the President have greater-than-usual opportunity to put politics aside. Indeed, in this, Gotabaya Rajapaksa has set the example and pace. Political expediency, for now at least, is not among his priority concerns. He’s been calling spades, spades, and that’s rare for politicians, especially leaders. More typical would be the opposite: wild promises, populist rhetoric and trying to please one and all (all the while knowing very well that none would benefit in the end).
Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected President by close to seven million people. The majority of them are well aware of the diga-palala of election pledges. It might be correct to say that people vote in the hope that one or two of the promises would be delivered. Honest effort and a few signals that indicate intent and rudimentary progress should do the trick if are talking about chances of victory in a General Election following the kind of victory that Gotabaya secured.
In other words Gotabaya, if he were to lead the SLPP campaign or at least play a key role in it, doesn’t need to break a sweat. He doesn’t have to play politician. What would be surprising, fresh and welcome would be for him to reject all pressure and temptation to be a typical politician at this point, with elections around the corner.
He could do what others did not. Do. Yes, ‘do’. Just ‘do’. Do it. Just do it.
What’s ‘it’ here? In a word, the ‘unpopular’. Things that may not be received with wild applause. Must-do things. Things that might at first make ‘seasoned politicians’ say ‘that won’t win us any votes’ or ‘you can’t win elections that way.’ They say such things partly because that’s all they know. Frills and not substance is what they are all about.
Forget politics, then, is what is recommended. And then? Well, the President has shown that he prefers not to mince his words. He was honest with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. To those worried about the Chinese footprint in Sri Lanka he essentially said, ‘stop whining, invest instead.’ His government and especially the law enforcement agencies and the Foreign Minister have handled the Swiss Embassy’s foot-in-mouth episode with exemplary professionalism.
That’s international relations. How about on the domestic front? Well, there are things that need to be done and things he would do well to resist. In terms of the latter, the pressure and temptation to indulge in political patronage should be resisted, be it the use of presidential pardons or favoring loyalty over proven expertise in appointments. As for the former, the President hasn’t been twiddling his thumbs. He came with a doer’s reputation and he hasn’t done anything to make anyone doubt this.
Protection of resources, especially forest reserves. Safeguarding national integrity and thwarting attempts to scuttle the same via Eelamist devolutionist designs. Ensuring sovereignty is not compromised through bilateral agreements that are against the national interest such as the SOFA, ACSA and the MCC Compact. These are some areas. Then there’s nepotism. There’s the independence of the judiciary. The integrity of systems. Law and order.
Black areas, all. Easy to talk the language of pragmatism. Easy to say ‘I will attend to these later’. Later, however, quickly slips down the priority list and ends up in an unhappy place called ‘Never.’
Since the General Election is to be held soon, the atypical will not come with political costs or, if there are costs they won’t be significant.
It’s a happy place to be in if a leader is serious about leading and leading a nation and a people to a different, more efficient, principled and sustainable future. Gotabaya Rajapaksa is excellently positioned. It’s all his to wreck. It’s as simple as that.
This article was first published in the Daily Mirror [December 19, 2019]
malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com
08 December 2019
13:59
By Malinda Words
In: Ameer Ali, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Presidential Election 2019, Sajith Premadasa, SLFP, SLPP, TNA, UNP
1 comment
By Malinda Words
In: Ameer Ali, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Presidential Election 2019, Sajith Premadasa, SLFP, SLPP, TNA, UNP
1 comment
Election results can be skinned any which way you like
| A warm but flawed reading of the 2015 result, |
People from the same camp, in terms of who they voted for, can and do come up with different reasons for victory, or if that's the case, defeat.
For example, some who voted for Gotabaya Rajapaksa could put his victory down to one or more of the following: a) ineptitude of the Yahapalana regime and failure to deliver on promises, b) the need for a strong and tested leader in the face of new threats to national security, c) perceptions that he was a doer as opposed to a talker (that’s Sajith), d) a strong, determined and well-coordinated campaign as opposed to Sajith Premadasa’s wayward, disorganized effort further marred by in-fighting.
Others could point to the overwhelming surge in the anti-UNP vote from areas dominated by Sinhala Buddhists and claim that it was a response to unnecessary and endless needling of the majority community by various UNP spokespersons. They could add that lack of clarity on the part of Sajith Premadasa on his arrangement with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) given that party’s Eelamist posturing through conditions offered to and rejected by the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) was key.
So it is about strengths of the winner and weaknesses of the loser and/or their respective parties. Strengths and weaknesses can be understood in different ways. How would some one who voted for Sajith explain the outcome?
Some might say ‘he didn’t have enough time to campaign since his party was slow in offering him nomination.’ Others would add, ‘and Ranil Wickremesinghe didn’t put his heart and soul into the campaign,’ even though the party leader has refuted this claim by pointing out that he was asked to campaign in the North and East, which districts he delivered. Whether he was key in this ‘deliverance,’ of course is another matter. Anyway, some inclined to be self-critical rather than looking for scapegoats have argued that there was very little campaigning at the grassroots, that the UNP’s party machinery was rusty, that UNPers were demoralized after the debacle at the local government elections in February 2018, and that Sajith’s ‘I-ME-and-Myself’ did not excite the floating voter, that Sajith had a tough brief to defend considering the (non) performance of the government in which he was a cabinet minister.
Finger-pointers who are not willing to acknowledge error or blemish, have simply said ‘it’s all because Gota appealed to Sinhala Buddhist chauvinists.’ Some say ‘It’s the BBS’. That’s the Bodu Bala Sena. The BBS and it’s political twin, Ravana Balakaya, following the election stated that the organizations would be dissolved following the parliamentary elections.
‘There you go!’ did someone exclaim? It’s easy to join dots (any which way you like) to prove you point. Still, the BBS and Ravana Balakaya ‘decisions’ are worth commenting on. Now these outfits are considered extremists by some who, interestingly, extrapolate the ‘extremism to the entire Sinhala Buddhist population. Interestingly too, they don’t apply the same logic to the National Thawheed Jamath (NTJ) and the Muslim community. Neither do they pause to compare and contrast the extremisms — the involvement of the BBS in Aluthgama and Digana versus the Easter Sunday attacks carried out by the NTJ. Cost of damage to property and lives lost could be but are not compared.
Back to the BBS and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. So is it that the BBS and the Ravana Balakaya, having ‘delivered’ the presidency to Gota, have concluded ‘mission accomplished, we got our man in and our work is done?’ Is Gotabaya a BBS man or Ravana Balakaya man? That would be utterly simplistic. First of all, the BBS and Ravana Balakaya are essentially fringe elements of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist discourse. More visible, of course, just like the NTJ, but that’s just one part of the story. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, when he was Secretary, Ministry of Defence, did accept an invitation extended to him by the BBS to be chief guest at the opening of an office somewhere in the Southern Province. That was out of order for a government servant. Does that make Gota a member of the BBS high command? Did the BBS deliver the presidency to Gota?
The BBS contested the last parliamentary elections as the ‘Buddhist People’s Front’. The total votes polls by that party was 20,377 or just 0.19%. Nation-wide. And that’s ‘push’ enough to decide who would be president? Sobering, ain’t it?
Forget the BBS; was Sinhala Buddhist nationalism the most significant element at the election? Ameer Ali, in an analysis titled ‘Sibling wins, patriarch celebrates and minorities stunned,’ in the Colombo Telegraph, certainly thinks so.
Ali believes that Ethno-religious nationalism decided the winner. He claims that ethno-religious Buddhist nationalists created and presented an image to the Sinhala public that the two minorities are a clear and imminent danger to national security. He claims, ‘an uncompromising but ultra-nationalist section of the institutionalised Buddhist clergy spearheaded a campaign to deprive the minorities of that privilege and rallied Sinhala Buddhist voters behind Gotabaya, who in their view will be the man to save Buddhist Sri Lanka.’ And, pointing to the fact that Sajith won handsomely in the North and East, but was trounced elsewhere, Ali concludes that it was indeed a battle between the Buddhist majority and the minorities. He says, in the process, that the minorities ‘hoped for a 2015 repeat scenario when their votes decided the winner in a tightly fought presidential contest and threw their support behind Sajith Premadasa.’
On the hand, why doesn’t Ali see that the Sinhalese and Buddhists could perceive an existentialist threat given statements issued by the likes of Sumanthiran and Hizbullah and of course the fact that terrorists from both the Tamil and Muslim communities unabashedly vented against Sinhala Buddhists? He doesn’t play that part of the game, but picks the reverse. It can’t cut just one way, though.
Anyway, Ali’s reading reminded me of an elegant meme created by Shanuki De Alwis just after the January 2015 election. It was a warm interpretation of the result, depicting the North and East embracing/protecting the rest of the country. Indeed, it seemed apt at the time. However, if you looked at the numbers, the story is very different. What the anti-Rajapaksa candidates gained between 2010 and 2015 from these two provinces are dwarfed by what Mahinda lost in just the Southern and Western Provinces. It was not just the minorities that defeated Mahinda in 2015.
Less than five years later, Mahinda’s brother swept these very same provinces by massive margins. Were people in the relevant districts suddenly converted to the political stance of the BBS (if we believe that claim)? Obviously there are other explanations. Yes, national security was an issue. So was incompetence. Incoherence. Utter confusion. You name it! That’s all Yahapalana attributes.
So why say ‘Buddhist’ or ‘Sinhala’ just because of the 6.9 million who voted for Gotabaya happened to be identified in such terms? Sure, they were Sinhalese and Buddhists, but on what basis can anyone say that it is only their ethnic identity and religious faith that determined choice? It’s a bit like saying all those in the North and East who voted against Gotabaya are Eelamists or Islamic Fundamentalists. They voted for Sajith, a Sinhalese, who was in rhetoric far more nationalistic than Gotabaya was, if anyone followed their respective speeches. So Sinhala Buddhist anxieties may have been part of the story, but it cannot be concluded that it was THE story of the election result.
It’s about how you want to skin it, in the end. Minority angst can of course privilege perceptions and hence persuade people like Ali to say ‘we are shocked’. Shocked because you didn’t expect it or shocked because you fear the consequences? Perceptions are real, even if they are not based on facts. You paint a monster and then ‘the monster’ haunts you. You believe your own propaganda. You have a set frame and cannot fathom that that’s not the only one available. You see certain things, choose not to see others and are absolutely ignorant of still other factors. So you go with what you know, throw in anxieties and political preferences/disappointments and get to ‘THIS IS WHAT IT WAS!’
It’s good to feel good or, as the case may be, to feed one’s anxieties in a masochistic kind of way. That’s however simplistic political analysis, nothing more.
This article was first published in the Sunday Morning newspaper [December 8, 2019]
05 September 2019
13:00
By Malinda Words
In: Elpitiya, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP, Pohottuwa, SLPP, Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, United National Party, UNP, UPFA
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By Malinda Words
In: Elpitiya, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP, Pohottuwa, SLPP, Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, United National Party, UNP, UPFA
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‘Elpitiya’ as beginning and end
Elections to every single local government authority in the Galle District were held on February 10, 2018. Except Elpitiya. That was due to a petition by the United National Party (UNP) pleading relief over perceived error in their nomination list being rejected. Time passed. We had the parliamentary crisis at the end of that year. We had the Easter Sunday attacks a few months ago. Even people who were aware of that election or rather non-election forgot about Elpitiya.
Not any longer. With the court directing the Elections Commission to hold elections for the Elpitiya Pradeshiya Sabhava immediately, we are seeing a rehearsal, a by-election of sorts and a referendum all rolled into one.
Here’s what happened. The yahapalanaya regime went into strange contortions to postpone local government elections. Well, provincial councils too, but that’s another story. By the time elections were called, the yahapalana coalition had cracked. Corruption, nepotism and incompetence had become too apparent to hide. The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) was the clear victor. President Sirisena’s true strength was revealed (the Sri Lanka Freedom Party [SLFP] got less than 15% of the vote and the UNP’s vote bank had dwindled to around 30%.
The outlook for the yahapalana group is bleak. The SLFP or rather Maithripala Sirisena would be forced to take a stand, i.e. whether to enter into a coalition with the SLPP, tag itself to the UNP (or a faction of that party led by Sajith Premadasa, if the internal crisis is not resolved) or go it alone. Unenviable. The JVP was not officially a member of the yahapalana coalition, but stood with Sirisena and later the UNP against Mahinda Rajapaksa and later the SLFP-SLPP ‘arrangement’ during the parliamentary crisis a year ago. The JVP has decided to do their own thing this time around. The risk is their strength being revealed, but it’s a risk they’ve embraced, for better or worse.
The UNP has spared no pains to paint President Sirisena as the villain of the piece called ‘Yahapalanaya.’ The UNP is still ‘government’. It is not opposition. It had mandate and responsibility. The UNP failed to deliver on all counts. The UNP is directly implicated in nepotism and corruption. The UNP marked itself as ‘incompetent.’ Ranil Wickremesinghe is the leader of this incompetent and corrupt UNP and Sajith Premadasa his lieutenant — no one can claim ‘I was a peon’ in the yahapalana regime.
All these parties fared abysmally in February 2018. The SLPP secured 50.57% of the total vote in the Galle District, the UNP got 26.65%, the UPFA got 11.65% and the JVP 6.27%.
The numbers may have changed. For the worse. Impatience with the regime may have enhanced rather than declined disenchantment for reasons of incompetence, incoherence and of course the scandalous failures on the security/intelligence front that led to the Easter Sunday attacks. There’s a strong likelihood that most of the 75,827 votes the UPFA received would slide towards the SLPP if the SLFP decides not to contest or have a pact with the UPFA. Even if the SLFP contests on its own, it is highly unlikely that it will retain the 11.65% share of February 2018. That could be halved or worse with ‘defection’ to the SLPP.
And so we have ‘Elpitiya’. Is Elpitiya a microcosm of Sri Lanka? No. The Tamil and Muslim communities are negligible in Elpitiya. They won’t be in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in certain other parts of the country. A UNP presidential candidate might be routed in Elpitiya (or in the Southern Province as a whole) but might win in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, although with a smaller margin than in 2015.
Elpitiya is rural. Whereas the SLPP handsomely won all the pradesheeya sabhas in the Galle District, the UNP secured the Galle Municipal Council. In fact the UNP did better in the urban and municipal council elections than in the pradesheeya sabha elections in all parts of the country.
This dissimilarity between the perceived urban and perceived rural gets smudged in important elections. For example, the tendency across the board was against the UNP in 1994 and clearly against Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015. In 2019, we might once again see a ‘unity’ of sorts between the urban and rural in terms of a common need to show the yahapalanists the political door.
Regardless of these realities, the result will most certainly reflect voter sentiment. It will be read by the victor as a reflection of national sentiments, especially if the SLPP wins as expected. The losers would be forced to come up with elaborate statistical analyses to demonstrate that things could be different in a presidential race. Nevertheless, a rout in Elpitiya would severely demoralize, say, the UNP loyalist in Elpitiya-like electorates throughout the country and even in less Elpitiya-like places. The ‘urban’ areas, for example. It would cost the UNP candidate, whoever it may be. Elpitiya, in short, would not only be read as ‘reflection’ of general sentiment, but would be a momentum giver and wrecker, to winner and loser(s) respectively.
The SLPP is ready, obviously. The JVP always has its ‘people’ on the ground. The loyalists will vote as they always do, never mind that they have struggled to win over people outside the party. The SLFP’s identity crisis (migrate to the SLPP, play bystander, contest?) will be resolved, one way or the other, but the outcome is unlikely to propel the party into believing that fielding its own candidate makes any sense. The UNP will have to contest.
The UNP will have to decide on who will lead the party’s efforts in Elpitiya. Will Sajith be asked to ‘put out or shut up’? Will the party have resolved the candidate-issue by then? It is not an election that the UNP wants to contest, but it is an election the party cannot avoid. If the UNP loses by a small margin there will be positives to carry to the presidential election. Ranil (or Sajith or both) could spur the loyalists to work harder. If they lose by a margin similar to that of February 2018 and the party can obtain the consolation argument, ‘we have not lost ground.’ However, if the margin of defeat is greater than those related to the other pradesheeya sabha elections in the Galle District, the UNP will have to stomach ‘done and dusted’.
Obviously, the SLPP cannot sit on February 2018 laurels either. If there’s gain, that locks up the presidential prize and if there’s the slightest decline, then it means the fat lady is yet to sing.
Either way, Elpitiya could very well be the place where the presidential election begins and ends. For all these parties.
malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com
22 January 2019
10:00
By Malinda Words
In: Constitutional Reform, Jayampathy Wickramaratne, JVP, M.A. Sumanthiran, SLFP, SLPP, UNP
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By Malinda Words
In: Constitutional Reform, Jayampathy Wickramaratne, JVP, M.A. Sumanthiran, SLFP, SLPP, UNP
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Sophomoric legislators cannot fix constitutional flaws
Constitutional reforms is a serious business, whether it is an amendment or a new document altogether. Even ordinary bills and acts of parliament are serious affairs. Such things require lawmakers, the Attorney General’s Department, the judiciary and the general public to act with sobriety and responsibility.
The basic premise of any new piece of legislation is that whatever exists is insufficient or flawed. That, however, is just one reason for attempting correction. It is (too) easy to use the horrendously flawed Second Republican Constitution (of 1978) as an excuse for (any old) amendment. ‘It can’t get worse’ is tired, silly and unethical reasoning for the simple reason that it (indeed!) can (get worse)!
Just think of all the amendments since 1978. Lawmakers didn’t exactly cover themselves with glory in those exercises. The most recent was the 19th Amendment. From draft to legislation makes a case for how not to engage in constitutional tinkering. The Supreme Court shot holes in the draft. The lawmakers did not amend the draft but almost rewrote it, leaving contradictions and grey areas. It was a shortsighted and mischievous piece of legislation, to put it mildly. Let us just mention, in passing, the following: a) presidential powers to dissolve parliament, b) the appointment and removal of the prime minister, c) the notion of a national government to circumvent limitations on cabinet-size, and d) a politician-heavy constitutional council which effectively mangled the idea of ‘independence’ in related institutions.
Since the Supreme Court determination on dissolution, there’s two documents before Parliament. First, the (new) 20th Amendment tabled by the JVP seeking to abolish the Executive Presidency, and secondly a new constitution, as per a TNA need, based on recommendations by the so-called committee of ‘experts’.
The merits and demerits of both exercises can be debated. Obviously, the second would make the first irrelevant. But what’s crucial to understand here is the fact that this parliament has proved beyond a shadow of doubt that it is incompetent when it comes to its fundamental purpose — law-making.
The Parliament made a mess of electoral reform, in effect replacing the existent proportional representation system with another proportional representation system, despite the rhetoric to the contrary! Today, across the political spectrum, people seem to have resigned themselves to reverting to the previous system, which each and every one of them deemed to be flawed, made for thuggery, the movement of vast sums of money and other ills.
We saw how they went about with the 19th Amendment. The proposed 20th Amendment shows how shortsighted and silly the JVP is, since it seeks the abolition of the executive presidency without accounting for the dangers of such an eventuality given the existence of the 13th Amendment (which moreover was constituted in the most undemocratic manner).
Now we have the ‘new constitution’ circus. The JVP has opposed it. Sections of the ruling coalition, especially the JHU, has objected to it. The TNA, as expected, whines about people being ‘political’ — as though politics is something absolutely alien to that party! The chances of a new constitution, therefore, are slim. That’s not something bad, even though the current constitution simply cries out for replacement. ‘Not bad’ because we just cannot trust this Parliament to do anything right regardless of intentions, which too they have taught us not to trust.
However, there is the danger of this utterly sophomoric set of legislators hoodwinking the masses by leaving intact articles whose repeal could spell trouble while surreptitiously inserting others that make those very same articles irrelevant (just like the articles pertaining to dissolution in the 19th Amendment). They can retain terms and notion (e.g. ‘unitary’ and ‘foremost status of Buddhism’) and throw in things that make them meaningless. They can’t make decent laws but they seem to be experts at the indecent end of things.
The question is simple: considering that this set of parliamentarians have demonstrated incompetence, proved they are either hooligans or have directly or indirectly sanctioned hooliganism, that electorally, the UNP, SLFP and JVP (making up a majority) have lost their standing and even legitimacy in the eyes of the voting public, and have abused power in numerous ways, can we and should we trust them with tinkering with the constitution? The answer is pretty obvious: No!
The constitution needs to be changed, yes, but not by these people. We just cannot trust them to do anything right. We cannot trust them to ensure that the sovereignty of the people is kept intact.
We can trust them to do just the opposite.
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malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com
11 November 2018
16:34
By Malinda Words
In: Mahinda Rajapaksa, Maithripala Sirisena, Ranil Wickremesinghe, SLFP, SLPP, UNP, Yahapalanaya
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By Malinda Words
In: Mahinda Rajapaksa, Maithripala Sirisena, Ranil Wickremesinghe, SLFP, SLPP, UNP, Yahapalanaya
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Who the *&%# is Maithripala Sirisena, huh?
Maithripala. Maithripala Sirisena. Pallewatte Gamaralalage Maithripala Yapa Sirisena. President. Executive President. A man who has the distinction of going against an incumbent considered to be unbeatable, Mahinda Rajapaksa, and defeating him for the presidency in January 2015. Enough to warrant some kind of special mention in history. His story is not yet over, but if it were to end today, that’s about it. Nothing more.
He is, undoubtedly, the man of the moment, but not for reasons that elicit loud and wild applause. Let’s first deal with the trivial and then move to the more serious implications of his presidency and in particular his recent move with respect to the sacking and appointments of Prime Ministers.
Maithripala appears to be a glutton for abuse from all quarters. He earned the wrath of the diehard loyalists of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) when he broke ranks and joined the party’s arch enemy, the United National Party (UNP). He was welcomed with open arms for obvious reasons — the UNP had neither held the presidency nor backed a winner in more than twenty years.
At the time, pro-UNP political analysts tried to make people believe that Maithripala would be a figurehead President, despite the constitutional provisions that rebel against such notions. The naive among the more sober believed that Maithripala would move to abolish his own office. The less naive thought that the 19th Amendment would contain provisions to turn their dream scenario into reality — a constitution-determined figurehead president and a Prime Minister with executive sway. We know what happened and what did not.
Naturally, the Rajapaksa camp did not miss a single opportunity to criticize Maithripala. It was not just criticism of course. There was excessive ridicule at his glaring errors of omission and commission. Some were thoughtful enough to tag Ranil Wickremesinghe and the UNP to such censure, most did not.
Maithripala’s language use was parodied, first by the Rajapaksa loyalists and later by UNPers increasingly frustrated by the simple fact that they had read him wrong, read the political process wrong and were clueless about the constitution. His humble beginnings were alluded to. The ‘gamarala’ part of his name was laughed at. His English language incompetency was mercilessly parodied in what Gehan Gunatilleke calls ‘The Puswedilla Franchise’ which he likened to ‘a dose of morphine offering the audience a coping mechanism.’
Hafeel Farisz in a review titled ‘The politics of Puswedilla’ lays it out in this way:
‘It [Puswedilla] boiled down to mimicking a system that we have either confused ourselves about or ridiculing a system that those in Colombo love to loathe. ‘Yakkos’ governing the country is not something that many have been used to prior to the incumbent regime assuming power.’
And he elaborates: ‘The Premadasa era is often used as a case point to negate this argument, but fact remains that even during that era, the institutional mechanisms had not felt the social ‘turnaround’ as it has now. It is in this context that the writer seems to be making hay, through Pusswedilla, catering to an audience that largely comprises a population segment that is becoming negligible in the larger political schism of Sri Lanka.’
Puswedilla elicits laughter, perhaps for the clever jokes but perhaps the appreciation is born of the need to cope. After all, there are people who think Sri Lanka is Colombo and that its theirs to govern by birthright. Or something like that. No place for yakkos, godayas, gamaralas and country bumpkins. Both were writing in 2014, a time when ‘Puswedilla’ focused on the Rajapaksas. When ‘the unbelievable’ happened, i.e. when Maithripala was found to have a mind of his own, the invective was simply directed at him. It was in fact targeting neither Rajapaksa nor Maithripala but the cultural ‘other’, those who are not seen as born-bred ‘Colombo People’ and were seen as culturally inferior because they were not fluent in English.
Well, it’s got worse. Maithripala has kicked the UNP in its proverbial teeth and worse, decided to bed with the arch enemy, the Rajapaksas. If UNPers were first amused, then worried, later anxious and confused, later still dismayed, they are now positively livid. They (and this includes senior and seasoned politicians like Mangala Samaraweera but not Ranil Wickremesinghe) have not minced their words.
Maithripala is therefore a politician who is grudgingly loved, first by the UNP and now by the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) and absolutely hated, first by Rajapaksa loyalists (who later morphed into the SLPP) and now by UNPers.
Back in the day whenever Maithripala did the foot-in-mouth number, the Rajapaksa loyalist guffawed, Ranil’s backers were silent for the most part. Today it’s the other way about. All of a sudden UNP loyalists have discovered that he’s homophobic. All of a sudden he’s violating the basic norms of democracy.
[Note, they were quiet when he spat on parliamentary arithmetic to appoint Ranil as Prime Minister on January 9, 2015, when he opened the national-list back door to allow people rejected at the polls to enter parliament and of course they were thrilled when he, along with Ranil, dissolved Parliament on the very day that the COPE report on the Central Bank bond scam was to be made public! All of a sudden he’s the villain.]
Whereas the legality of premiership claims (Mahinda Rajapaksa’s and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s) are contentious, that of Sirisena is not. When it comes to legitimacy, clearly the UNP and Sirisena (plus his SLFP) are also rans compared to Rajapaksa and the SLPP, if we go by the most recent election results.
On February 10, 2018, the SLPP demolished both the UNP and the SLFP. The UNP’s vote share fell from 45.7% in August 2015 to 32.63% or more than 13 percentage points. So, following an argument put forward by Mangala Samaraweera at the time (he claimed that more than half the population had rejected Rajapaksa), we can say that 77.37% rejected the UNP and 86.62% have rejected Maithripala Sirisena and the SLFP/UPFA. The SLPPsecured power in 239 local government bodies whereas the UNP got just 41 and the SLFP/UPFA led by Maithripala a humbling 10.The parliamentary composition does not reflect this nation-wide reality and that is partly why we have this present crisis (quite apart from the power aspirations of the key players).
The UNP now claims that Maithripala’s legitimacy draws from the support he received from the UNP in January 2015 and after the political divorce, he no longer has the legitimacy. Correct. Maithripala, it appears, picked the best option: he abandoned the illegitimate elephant-rail and clung to the far more legitimate saatakaya, to put it metaphorically.
Maithripala’s future is bleak. He’s now a prisoner of the SLPP and he probably will not have any decent cards to play after the next election. He has the power of the office and as the UNP learned to their dismay, it is considerable.
He demonstrated in no uncertain terms that without any political legitimacy to speak of he can still wreck the political equation. He demonstrated that the 19th Amendment was a sham. The UNP cannot complain because it was that party which authored the document. The Rajapaksa camp went along and we do not know whether Mahinda was aware of the flaws and if he did whether he planned to exploit them at the right time. What counts is that it is flawed.
If D.B. Wijetunga was a man who happened to be at the right place at the right time, it appears that Maithripala is a man who knew how to get to the right place at the right time. Some in the UNP may have taken him to be harmless or even a fool, but it’s clear that two can play that game and that Maithripala has come out ahead, as of now.
How will history judge Maithripala? Let us not be hasty, but let us just say that as of now, even as Rajapaksa loyalists are painting him in kind and appreciative colors, he’s not looking too good.
Malinda Seneviratne is a political analyst and freelance writer. malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com
15 February 2018
08:10
By Malinda Words
In: Maithripala Sirisena, Pohottuwa, Ranil Wickremesinghe, SLFP, SLPP, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, UNP, Yahapalanaya
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By Malinda Words
In: Maithripala Sirisena, Pohottuwa, Ranil Wickremesinghe, SLFP, SLPP, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, UNP, Yahapalanaya
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Mandate lost: no two words about it
Mahinda Rajapaksa, after losing the Presidential Election, making his now infamous from-the-window speech, blamed it ‘on the Tamils’. It was a crass, knee-jerk conclusion which was racist and a complete disavowal of his own and significant flaws. He has since sobered up.
Maybe the United National Party (UNP) will also sober up soon. It’s to their advantage to do so. Right now, it is apparent that the UNP is punch-drunk and even more incoherent than usual. ‘Even more’ because lack of clarity on multiple issues has been the hallmark of the UNP-led regime.
While some dismayed UNPers have called for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s blood, others have looked elsewhere to find reasons for the defeat. For example, Wickremesinghe’s closest political associates have pointed the finger at President Maithripala Sirisena. The UNP couldn’t really implement its economic policy, they argue.
So one might say that there is some self-reflection happening. What is strange however is that some stalwarts are blaming the defeat on the Government not putting Mahinda Rajapaksa, his brothers, sons and close friends behind bars. This means that either people didn’t want the Rajapaksas incarcerated or that was a non-issue for them or else they rewarded the Rajapaksas because, damn it, the UNP-SLFP yahapalana regime didn’t put them behind bars!
It’s as if a trail of broken campaign promises didn’t count. ECTA didn’t matter, neither did the sale of Hambantota. Constitutional jugglery starting from the flawed 19th Amendment which allowed for a bloated cabinet didn’t count. Attempts to smuggle in a federal constitution was a non-factor. Nepotism starting with the President with the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers was forgotten. And no, the Central Bank bond scam just did not happen! This is what these people want us to believe. The truth is that the professionals and academics as well as staunch believers in the good-governance pledge got disillusioned with the regime pretty fast.
Still, Mangala Samaraweera and others will not believe it. Indeed, they believe the UNP won! According to Mangala, 6.1 million people (55.3%) had ‘marched to the polls and voted against a return to the Rajapaksa rule'. He says that whereas Mahinda Rajapaksa commanded 5.77 million votes in January 2015, he couldn’t even muster 4.95 million votes this time.
The numbers are correct. The interpretation silly. Sorry, stupid. Reminds one of that old line about falsehoods and forces me to add to it thus: ‘there are lies, damned lies, statistics and Mangala Samaraweera’.
Let’s apply Mangala’s logic to his party and that of the President. We could conclude that roughly 7.4 million and a whopping 9.5 million marched to the polls to vote against the UNP and SLFP/UPFA respectively. How Mangala interprets the following facts only he would know, but these are numbers that ought to rouse the UNP from its deep stupor.
The UNP vote declined from 5.1 million in August 2015 to just 3.6 million on February 10, 2018 which is a loss of around 1.5 million votes. The UNP’s vote share fell from 45.7% in August 2015 to 32.63% or more than 13 percentage points. So, following Mangala, we can say that 77.37% have rejected the UNP and 86.62% have rejected Maithripala Sirisena and the SLFP/UPFA. Happy?
If you take out the areas where the vast majority of voters are Tamils, the numbers should terrify the UNP. The UNP lost the following districts which the party had secured in August 2015: Colombo, Gampaha, Kandy, Matale, Trincomalee, Puttalam, Polonnaruwa and Kegalle. The party retained Nuwara Eliya (down fro 59.1% to 37.3%), Digamadulla (down from 46% to 26%) and Badulla (down from 54.8% to 32%). Where the UNP lost, it lost badly, securing around 25% of the vote. The ‘national’ figures are obviously boosted by the returns from strongholds where too there’s a decline in popularity indicated.
The coalition that defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015 is no longer together. If they were, then one could not only add what each got but it is likely that they would have polled more than they actually did. T
his is undeniable: the UNP, SLFP and JVP contested SEPARATELY. It is ridiculous to operate as though 2018 is 2015 and that the parties are united. They are not.
If this election was, among other things, a battle for the ownership of the SLFP then the party has gone to Mahinda Rajapaksa, one can conclude. Using Mangala-logic, it can be argued that in subsequent elections the majority of those who voted for the SLFP/UPFA is more likely to go with the ‘pohottuwa’ than the ‘aliya’ not least of all because the UNP has all but ended the marriage with the President’s party. Even if one were to split the SLFP/UPFA vote equally between the UNP and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the latter would gather close to 50% in some districts and well over 50% in most.
If the numbers are used to apportion district gains assuming it was a General Election, then with the bonus seats coming into play the SLPP would have secured a majority of parliamentary seats. If the system used at the February 10 election was employed, the vast majority of electorates would have been won by the SLPP. Perhaps using such frames Mangala could calculate who marched for what and where they ended up. Perhaps following the dictum ‘it’s good to hope for the best but expect the worst,’ Mangala could extrapolate this result onto the outcome of a general election where the SLFP/UPFA voters would vote for the SLPP en masse. That would sober everyone up.
As things stand, only those in the UNP who are in denial would find consolation in Mangala’s thesis on the local government election.
I have no issue with delusion if it helps alleviate pain. What’s not pardonable is the distraction and deliberate fudging of political reality.
The UNP-SLFP regime has been proven to be incompetent and found to be corrupt. It was a vote of no-confidence on the regime; going even by Mangala’s Arithmetic more than half the total number that voted rejected the UNP-SLFP Unity Government. The numbers in Parliament no longer reflect the sentiments of the electorate. It is a travesty of justice to operate as though the people do not count. It is immoral to take refuge in the 19th Amendment’s provision for Parliament not to be dissolved before March 2020. The numbers can be found to introduce a special clause to facilitate dissolution.
The mandate has been lost and although Mangala and others feign to be at a loss to comprehend what has happened the fact has not been lost on the people. No mandate. No legitimacy. It is time to figure out a civilized exit strategy.
Malinda Seneviratne is a freelance writer. malindasenevi@gmail.com. www.malindawords.blogspot.com






